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Q NCE upon a time, and not so very long ago, a child was born, 
much to the delight of its lawyer-parents. As children will, it 
brought much joy and only occasional moments of dismay and con-
cern during its early, formative years. But one day it entered the 
terrible teens, and at age sixteen it became, like many teen-agers, 
baffling, confusing, and frustrating, giving rise to frenzied attempts 
to cope with and control the complexities of its behavior. Its name? 
The Federal Estate Tax Marital Deduction. 
Two rather startling developments during the past year focused 
attention on the federal estate tax marital deduction. Each in 
its own quite different way gave rise to a feeling that "the halcyon 
• Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.-Ed. Parts of this article com-
prised portions of speeches for the 17th Univ. of Miami Tax Institute, the American 
Bankers Association 1964 Midwinter Trust Meeting, Corporate Fiduciaries' Association 
of Boston, Pennsylvania State Bar Association June 1964 meeting, and various estate 
planning council meetings. 
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days"1 had passed and an era of stricter enforcement of the technical 
requirements for qualification was at hand.2 
The first development involved the Supreme Court, which, 
during the October 1963 term (1963-1964), handed down opinions 
in five cases involving federal tax liability. Three dealt with pro-
cedural matters;8 the other two, involving substantive interpretation 
of the Internal Revenue Code, were both concerned with the federal 
estate tax marital deduction. The first of these two cases, United 
States v. Stapf,4 is an illustration of statutory interpretation in the 
light of the underlying purpose of legislation; it reached an expected5 
and sensible result.6 The second, Jackson v. United States,1 though it 
might be regarded as hyper-technical by some, is typical of the spate 
of decisions in the lower courts8 illustrating situations which should 
not have arisen9 and which should create no impediment to obtain-
ing the marital deduction in well-planned estates.10 
I. See, e.g., Cantwell, Ten Years of Experience With the Marital Deduction, ll6 
DICTA 197, 201 (1959); Fleming, Five Years' Experience With the Marital Deduction, 
34 CHICAGO B. R.EcoRD 247 (1953); Golden, A Decade With the Marital Deduction, 97 
TRUSTS &: EsTATES 304, 361 (1958); Lovell, Administering the Marital Deduction-A 
Summary of Five Years' Experience, 92 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 812 (1953). In varying 
degrees the articles suggest that the statute was being administered in the "spirit" in 
which it was enacted. 
2. See Lloyd, Revenue Procedure 64-19-Background of Drafting Problems, IOll 
TRusrs &: EsTATES 898, 900 (1964): "Paul Sargent ••• characterized the tax laws as 
providing an interesting study in the triumph of intellect over common sense. I would 
say that the issuance of Revenue Procedure 64-19 proves the truth of this statement." 
3. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 2llll 
(1963); United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). 
4. 375 U.S. 118 (1963). 
5. See Bushman, Thoughts From Stapf-The Widow's Election in Community 
Property States, 103 TRusrs &: EsTATES 592 (1964). 
6. Bushman, supra note 5; Polasky, Panoramic View of Current Tax Develop-
ments, 103 TRusrs &: EsTATES 253, 257 (1964); Polasky, Current Developments in 
Taxation, 43 TRUsr BULL. 12, 38 (1964). 
7. 376 U.S. 503 (1964), 63 MICH. L. REv. 924 (1965), discussing this case. In addition 
to the point there discussed, Jackson has created some concern because of inclusion of 
the statement that "Qualification for the marital deduction must be determined as 
of the time of death," id. at 508, and disqualification based on the fact that the interest 
was not "a vested right," id. at 506, which was "indefeasible" at that time. Id. at 507. 
This language may have given rise to certain recent statements of representatives of 
the Internal Revenue Service relative to the "vesting" requirement. See note 151 infra. 
8. A recent unpublished study undertaken in connection with the American 
Bar Foundation's Federal Tax Procedure Project (Wright &: Polasky, Co-Directors) 
indicates that of the thirty to thirty-five published estate tax opinions of the federal 
circuit courts of appeals, Court of Claims, and district courts during the past three 
years, one-third dealt with the marital deduction. 
9. A number of the recent cases are collected and briefly discussed in Polasky, 
Some Recent Federal Estate and Gift Tax Developments, in Institute for Continuing 
Legal Education, Michigan Course Handbook No. IO, 1964, pp. 10, 18-22; and Polasky, 
Some Recent Federal Estate and Gift Tax Developments, in INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUCATION, THIRD ANNUAL PROBATE SEMINAR I, 6-13 (1963); Polasky, supra 
note 6; CAsNER, EsTATE PLANNING, SUPPLEMENT 297-337 (1964). 
10. Even the recent denial of the deduction in Estate of Pierpont v. Com-
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The second development, which was far more unsettling to the 
toiler in the estate-planning vineyard, was the decision of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to delay determination of estate taxes where 
the claimed marital deduction involved a certain, widespread type 
of pecuniary bequest to the surviving spouse.11 On March 19, 1964, 
the Internal Revenue Service announced its position in this problem 
area,12 and Rev. Proc. 64-19 was published in the April 13, 1964, 
Internal Revenue Bulletin.13 Since its promulgation, a significant 
amount of the time and energy of trust men and attorneys has been 
focused upon the action required to conform with its provisions. 
The analysis which follows is directed toward an exploration 
of the background and scope of the underlying controversy and the 
future feasibility of various types of formula clauses used to obtain 
the maximum allowable marital deduction for estate tax purposes. 
I. REv. PRoc. 64-19 
Revenue Procedure 64-19 sets forth the position of the Internal 
Revenue Service "relative to allowance of the marital deduction in 
cases where there is some uncertainty as to the ultimate distribution 
to be made in payment of a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust 
where the governing instrument provides that the executor or 
trustee may satisfy bequests in kind with assets at their value as 
finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes."14 
A. Background 
A bit of background may be helpful in understanding the impor-
tance and scope of this statement of the Service's position and its 
implications for the draftsman of wills and trusts. 
missioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), afferming Estate of Melvin G. Pierpont, 21 
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 286 (1962) (holding that a gift to the wife of all income from the 
marital trust coupled with a power that "the entire remaining principal ••• shall be 
paid ••• as my said wife may designate and appoint in her last will ••. " did not 
qualify because, under Maryland law, the donee of such a general power of ap-
pointment may not appoint the property to her estate unless granted the right by 
express language of the will), can be finessed by careful drafting of the gift designed to 
qualify under I.R.C., § 2056(b)(5). The Pierpont decision is discussed in Newsletter of 
the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, No. I, 1965, p. 3. A 
similar result was reached in Estate o·f William C. Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957). These 
cases simply illustrate the importance of a knowledge of local law characterizing 
the nature of the gift. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 19, 24 
(D. Kan. 1964). 
ll. Peter, Revenue Procedure 61-19-lnstance of ABA-lRS Cooperation, 103 
TRUSTS &: EsrATES 908 (1964). 
12. Announced March 19, 1964, in T.I.R. 553. 
13. Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 CuM. BuLL. 682 (hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc. 64-19). 
At least one commentator suggests that the courts will uphold the validity of the 
Procedure. Colson, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 61-19, lO THE 
PRACTICAL LAW. 69, 70 (1964). 
14. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § I. 
812 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:809 
The federal estate tax marital deduction,15 enacted in 1948,16 
permits a deduction of up to one-hal£17 of the decedent's adjusted 
gross estate18 for "the value of any interest in property which passes 
or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse."19 With 
its advent, the lawyer-draftsman was faced with the task of assuring 
qualification of sufficient property to secure the deduction where 
this was deemed desirable. 
Obviously, a husband could leave all of his property outright 
to his surviving spouse and be assured of full qualification. Some, 
however, regard this as an undesirable overqualification, giving rise 
to unnecessary estate taxation; while only half of the husband's 
property would be taxed in his estate, the entire remaining property 
would be subject to estate tax again in the wife's estate, subject to 
allowance of a credit for previously taxed property20 if she dies 
within ten years after her husband.21 And, of course, there were 
15. Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. For a general discussion of the marital 
deduction, including the requirements and methods for qualifying assets, see Polasky, 
Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, Tax Counselor's Q., June 1959, 
p. l; Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, 102 
TRUSTS &: EsrATES 934 (1963). The report of subcommittees referred to in this article 
are reports of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American 
Bar Association and are published in the Annual Proceedings of the Section as well as 
in Trusts and Estates. 
16. For historical background and discussion of earlier legislation, see Pedrick, The 
Revenue Act of 1948-Income, Estate and Gift Taxes-Divided They Fall, 43 ILL. L. 
R.Ev. 277 (1948); Polasky, supra note 15; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-Thi! 
Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1097 (1948). 
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(l) (hereinafter cited as I.R.C. by section). 
18. I.R.C., § 2056(c)(l). 
19. I.R.C., § 2056(a). 
20. I.R.C., § 2013. 
21. For example, consider a case where a husband had an estate of $200,000 (after 
deduction of expenses and debts other than taxes) and the wife had no property of 
her own; three of the many alternative methods of disposition are: (1) a gift of a 
life estate to the wife and remainder to the children, (2) an outright gift of the 
property to the wife, or (3) use of the familiar bifurcated gift whereby the wife 
receives a qualifying bequest equal to the maximum marital deduction ($100,000 here) 
and the residue, after bearing the burden of all taxes, provides income for the wife for 
life with the remainder to the children. Assuming the husband dies first and the 
unlikely proposition that corpus neither increases nor decreases prior to the sub-
sequent death of the wife, the federal estate tax results, assuming no community prop-
erty, might be expected to show the following: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Husband's Estate $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 
Less: Marital Deduction -0- $100,000 $100,000 
The $60,000 Exemption $ 60,000 60,000 60,000 
Taxable Estate $140,000 $ 40,00(f $ 40,000 
Federal Estate Tax• 31,500 4,800 4,800 
Wife's Estate .. -0- $195,200 $100,000 
Less: The $60,000 Exemption 60,000 60,000 
Taxable Estate""• -0- $135,200 $ 40,000 
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(and are) testators who desired to take full advantage of any available 
marital deduction minimizing estate taxes, but who were equally 
adamant that only the minimum amount of property necessary to 
secure such deduction should pass to the surviving spouse in such 
form as to be includable in her estate and subject to her control.22 
To satisfy this desire for qualifying sufficient property to secure the 
maximum marital deduction and "not one penny more," attorneys 
began to include a so-called "formula clause" in wills. 
I. Evolution of Formula Clauses 
The wisdom, or folly, of using a formula clause has been the 
subject of a continuing, often delightful, debate.23 Suffice it to say 
for present purposes that formula clauses were rapidly and widely 
adopted.24 Several basic types were devised, and the relative desira-
bility of each (with innumerable variations of the basic patterns) 
has also been the subject of continuing discussion.25 
Pecuniary Formulas. The first basic type, often referred to as a 
"pecuniary bequest," provides for a dollar amount bequest.26 Its 
function is simply to measure the dollar amount or value of the gift, 
and early clauses hewing closely to the language of the Internal 
Revenue Code phrased the bequest in terms of "an amount equal to" 
one-half of the testator's adjusted gross estate. 
Federal Estate Tax 
Total Federal Estate Tax on 







Notes: • After maximum credit taken for state death taxes. 
4,800 
$ 9,600 
• • Taxes paid from non-marital share, if any, ignores payment of state 
succession taxes. 
••• Assumes no credit for tax on prior transfers (I.R.C., § 2013). 
22. See Durbin, Marital Deduction Formula Revisited, 102 TRusrs &: EsrATES 545 
(1963); Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 103 TRUSTS & EsrATES 536 (1964). 
23. Compare Trachtman, Leaping in the Dark, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 922 (1954), with 
Sargent, To Each His Own, id. at 933. 
24. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 15, at 943. 
25. E.g., see Golden, supra note 22; Kiley & Golden, The Residue Formula as 
an Aid to the Executor, 90 TRUSTS & EsrATES 824 (1951); Kiley & Golden, A Residue 
Formula for Maximum Marital Deduction, 89 TRUSTS & EsrATES 744 (1950). Cf. Bolte, 
Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 532 (1961); Durbin, 
supra note 22. See generally Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 
15rn INST. ON FED. TAX. 909 (1957); Craven, Marital Deduction Problems-Use of the 
Percentage Formula Clause, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 613 (1961). 
26. For examples of early types of pecuniary formula clauses, see Casner, How To 
Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 190 (1960); 
Lauritzen, Marital Deduction Bequests-Current Problems and Drafting Suggestions, 
8 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 247,286 (1964); Polasky, supra note 15, at 44, 54. For an up-dated 
clause, see Report of Subcommittee on Forms for Marital Deduction Planning, 103 
Tausrs & ESTATES 961, 962 (1964). CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, SUPPLEMENT 793 (1964). 
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The pecuniary bequest, carved out of the estate before disposi-
tion of the residue, was a distinct departure from the prior practice 
of providing for primary objects of bounty through a division of 
the residuary estate.27 When drafted as a general legacy, the amount 
(once determined) 28 is fixed and is satisfiable before division of the 
residue among the residuary legatees. Thus, though the dollar 
amount of the widow's share was fixed, the fractional portion of the 
total estate assets actually received by the widow would vary with 
fluctuations in estate assets between the time of valuation and distri-
bution, a relatively larger share being received by her if assets 
declined in value during administration and the converse being true 
when a general appreciation in asset values occurred. 
Fractional Share Formulas. Concern over a number of additional, 
potentially troublesome administrative problems29 foreseeable in 
connection with a pecuniary clause led to development of a second 
major species of formula-the "fractional share."30 This quite dif-
ferent clause measures the gift in terms of a fractional share of the 
decedent's estate and was sometimes expressed as "that fractional 
share of my residuary estate which, together with all other property 
qualifying for the federal estate tax marital deduction, is equal to 
one-half of my adjusted gross estate as determined for purposes of the 
federal estate tax .... " Since the fraction, computed on the basis 
of federal estate tax values,31 remains constant in relation to the 
residuary estate82 (however defined) upon which it operates, the 
marital deduction gift shares ratably in any appreciation or deprecia-
tion of assets prior to distribution. Use of the fractional share clause 
does, however, require rather careful specification of the manner in 
which the fraction is to be determined.38 Moreover, problems of 
determining the appropriate shares of income and principal to be 
distributed become complicated where partial distributions occur 
during administration.84 
27. Durbin, supra note 22, at 545; Golden, supra note 22, at 537; Lauritzen, The 
Marital Deduction, 103 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 318 (1964). 
28. Bolte, supra note 25, at 535. The "amount" depends on the choice of valuation 
date. 
29. See generally Part III of this article infra. 
30. Lloyd, supra note 2, at 898. 
31. See Golden, supra note 22, at 538. The rationale behind the use of federal estate 
tax values to define the fraction (and for that purpose only) is discussed infra note 
116 and accompanying text. See also CASNER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 796. 
32. See Durbin, supra note 22. The fraction may change, however, if non-pro-rata 
distributions occur during administration. 
33. See Casner, supra note 26; see also text accompanying notes 110-21 infra. 
34. See discussion in text accompanying notes 122-148 infra. 
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2. "Problem-Pecuniary" Language 
Despite the administrative problems, real or imagined, which 
caused some counselors to prefer the fractional share disposition, 
others regarded the pecuniary formula as tending to be somewhat 
easier to express and to administer. Perhaps most importantly, it 
appeared to afford significant opportunities for minimizing the 
total estate taxes incurred by the estates of both spouses. Thus it 
became the favorite of a sizable minority of draftsmen.85 
A number of problems, however, brought about the type of 
pecuniary bequest which triggered the recent "furor over formulas" 
and occasioned the issuance of Revenue Procedure 64-19. First, if 
the will directed the executor to pay the widow an amount pf cash 
equal to the maximum available marital deduction, the conversion 
of assets into cash would normally incur expense and might well 
require recognition of gains or losses by the estate for income tax 
purposes (measured by the difference between the basis, ascertained 
by federal estate tax values,86 and the net receipts from disposition).87 
For this and other reasons making it desirable to have the widow re-
ceive some or all of the distributable assets in kind, most draftsmen 
began to include in pecuniary formulas a clause empowering the 
executor to satisfy the bequest in kind as well as in cash. Further, 
to avoid any suggestion that distributions must include a fractional 
share of each asset, the executor was given discretion to select the 
assets to be distributed in satisfaction of the marital bequest.38 
Absent further provision, however, distribution in kind would 
result in recognition of gain or loss by the estate where the value of 
the distributed assets at distribution date differed from their value 
for federal estate tax purposes. 39 The bequest to the widow, whether 
of a specified sum or determined by a formula provision, establishes 
a dollar-amount legacy due from the estate. Satisfaction by delivery 
35. Many able commentators still express a preference for the pecuniary (e.g., 
Covey, The Marital Deduction and the Use of Formula Provisions, P-H Wxu.s-TRUSTS-
EsTATE PLANNING FORMS 1[ 121, at 287 (1962); Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction 
Formula Clauses Under New Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAXATION 352 (1964)) as did others 
prior to the inception of the current controversy over pecuniary clauses. E.g., McGorry, 
Pecuniary or Fractional Formula?, 98 TRUSTS & EsTATES 422 (1959). 
36. I.R.C., § 1014. 
37. I.R.C., § 1001. 
38. See Golden, supra note 22; Lauritzen, supra note 27. Absent a provision to the 
contrary, property distributed in kind is valued at its value at date of distribution 
for distribution purposes. See, e.g., Estate of Gauff, 27 Misc. 2d 407, 211 N.Y.S.2d 
583 (1960). 
39. E.g., Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), afj'd, 83 F.2d 1019 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936); Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 325. 
See discussion in text accompanying notes 163-76 infra. 
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of non-cash assets is treated as a sale of the property to the widow 
for the dollar amount due, and the widow is deemed to take the 
property by purchase, rather than by inheritance, thus receiving a 
basis for the property equivalent to its fair market value at the time 
of the distribution.40 
Now, assume for the moment that the testator left an adjusted 
gross estate of one million dollars, composed of 5,000 shares of A 
stock worth 500,000 dollars and 5,000 shares of B stock worth 500,000 
dollars. I£ the executor decided to satisfy the 500,000 dollar bequest 
with A stock and. if it is assumed that the 5,000 shares of A stock, 
which had an estate tax value of 500,000 dollars, had now increased 
in value to 800,000 dollars, he might transfer to the widow % of the 
A stock (present value 500,000 dollars). Since the basis of the entire 
holding of A stock was 500,000 dollars, a transfer of % (with an 
aliquot basis of 312,500 dollars) would result in a gain to the estate 
of 187,500 dollars subject to income tax at capital gains rates. 
To avoid incurring this tax, attorneys began to include a clause 
specifying that assets distributed in satisfaction of the marital bequest 
were to be valued at the values determined for federal estate tax 
purposes. Then, if the executor distributed A stock, he would 
distribute all of it (federal estate tax value and, thus, basis of 500,000 
dollars) in satisfaction of the 500,000 dollars due the marital share, 
and the estate would recognize neither gain nor loss.41 
At this stage of the development of the pecuniary formula, then, 
it became fairly common to find clauses granting the executor dis-
cretion to satisfy the marital bequest (1) in cash or in kind, (2) with 
assets selected by him, and (3) with assets valued at the values 
determined for federal estate tax purposes. The following is an 
example42 typical of such dispositive provisions, but which might 
not presently qualify under Rev. Proc. 64-19: 
"If my wife, March Smith, shall survive 
me, I devise and bequeath to State Na-
tional Bank of Zoneville, or its corporate 
successor, as Trustee, an amount equal to 
one-half (½) of the value of my adjusted 
gross estate as finally determined for fed-
40. Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948). See discussion in 
text accompanying notes 167-73 infra. 
41. See, e.g., I CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING 816 (3d ed. 1961). See discussion in text 
following notes 192-95 infra. 
42. This clause appeared in Polasky, supra note 15, at 54 and was reprinted in 
Lauritzen, supra note 26, at 286. Its use is not recommended in its present form· the 
clause is set forth for illustrative purposes only and should not be used unless 'it is 
amended to comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19 or clearly meets the 
requirements of § 2.02 of the Rev. Proc. See note 55 infra. 
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Flexibility: Discretion To 
Distribute in Cash or in 
Kind and To Select 
Assets So Used 
eral estate tax purposes, less the aggregate 
amount of marital deductions, if any, al-
lowed by reason of interests in property 
passing or which have passed to my wife 
otherwise than by the terms of this Article 
of my Will. My Executor shall have full 
authority and discretion to satisfy said be-
quest in cash or in kind, or partly in cash 
and partly in kind, and to select and desig-
nate, and to convey and assign to the 
Trustee of said Trust Estate the cash, secu-
rities, or other assets, including real estate 
or any interests therein, which shall consti-
{ 
tute said Trust Estate; provided, however, 
that in no event shall there be included in 
"Tainted Asset" Clause4S said Trust Estate any asset or the proceeds 
of any asset with respect to which a marital 
deduction would not be allowable, if so in-
{ 
eluded; and provided, further, that assets 
Avoidance of capital applied on said bequest in kind shall for 
Gain to Estate on Distri- such purposes be valued at the values 
bution thereof finally determined for the purposes 
of the federal estate tax on my estate .... " 
The discretion granted to the fiduciary appeared to offer delight-
ful opportunities for minimizing total estate tax burdens on the 
estates of both spouses through a bit of post-mortem planning.44 If 
the claim could be satisfied with assets which had appreciated, it 
would seem that it could also be satisfied with assets, having a basis 
equal to the claim, which had declined in value prior to distribution. 
For example, suppose that the 5,000 shares of B stock (with an 
estate tax value and basis of 500,000 dollars) had a distribution 
date value of 400,000 dollars. If the clause granting the executor full 
authority and discretion to satisfy the bequest in cash or in kind and 
to select the assets to be so used should be deemed broad enough to 
permit the executor to distribute either the A stock or the B stock, 
distribution of the B stock to the widow would tend to hold down 
the size of the widow's estate subject to estate tax at her death 
and to permit allocation of income (from increasing dividends 
on the A stock, perhaps accounting for its appreciation) to benefi-
ciaries in lower income tax brackets. It is not unlikely that the 
prospect of an amicable arrangement between the widow, her de-
voted children (the residuary legatees), and the executor designed 
4!1. See Polasky, supra note 15, at 25, for discussion of tbe "tainted assets" problem; 
HARRIS, HANDUNG FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES § 2!11 (1959). 
44. Lloyd, supra note 2, at 899. 
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to produce a full marital deduction for the decedent's estate while 
satisfying the marital bequest with assets having a distribution-date 
value less than the deduction allowed and not representative of 
the overall appreciation or depreciation of estate assets (indeed, 
carefully selected to channel the greatest appreciation to the residue 
and the maximum depreciation to the widow's share) proved dis-
turbing to the Internal Revenue Service. 45 
B. The Ruling 
In any event, rumors spread as early as 1961 that in some 
districts Service personnel had questioned the allowability of the 
marital deduction where clauses of this type had been used.46 By 
early 1963, it became apparent that allowance of the marital deduc-
tion in audited estates in which the dispositive instrument contained 
such a clause was being delayed in a number of Internal Revenue 
Service Regions pending disposition of requests for technical advice 
from the National Office.47 Quite naturally, in view of the number 
of such clauses in previously drawn wills, attorneys and professional 
fiduciaries became adamant, apprehensive, or both. 
Some practitioners took the view that, despite the use of the 
clause, the fiduciary law of their states would require that the widow 
share equitably and ratably in any appreciation or depreciation prior 
to distribution.48 Others, however, suggested that it was not at all 
clear that the executor could not exercise the broad discretion 
specifically granted by the testator, and they realistically recognized 
that where harmonious family situations existed the validity of 
such distributions, acquiesced in by the surviving spouse, residuary 
legatees, and fiduciary, would not be presented explicitly to a court. 
In that light, the Service's concern with the possibility of manipula-
tion was at least understandable. 
I. Negotiation 
The situation existing during 1963 posed formidable practical 
problems for attorneys and corporate fiduciaries. This was not an 
issue involving an isolated, atypical set of facts. Tens of thousands 
of such clauses had been incorporated in previously drawn instru-
45. See Cohen, Treasury Views on Current Questions, 104 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 9 (1965). 
46. Peter, supra note 11. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Some regarded the Service's position as without foundation. See Lauritzen, 
supra note 27. The question of allowability of the marital deduction in such a case 
had, however, been raised many years earlier. Casner, Estate Planning: Marital Deduc-
tion Provisions of Trusts, 64 HARV, L. REv. 582, 593-96 (1951). 
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ments. In some cases the testator was dead, and in others, lack of 
testamentary capacity, inability to alter irrevocable inter vivos trusts, 
or lack of contact with the client rendered corrective amendment or 
substitution of a new dispositive clause impossible or unlikely. Thus, 
with respect to existing wills, there was widespread apprehension 
over the possible loss of the marital deduction ( or at least protracted 
negotiation and potential litigation) where the suspect dispositive 
provision had been used. Further, those engaged in planning estates 
and drafting effective dispositive instruments are far less interested 
in speculation over the validity of a Treasury position than in the 
establishment of definite and workable guidelines assuring qualifica-
tion for the deduction. The Treasury, too, faced distinct administra-
tive problems as a result of the position taken by some field offices. 
Wisely, the Bar recognized that this was not a situation calling 
for adamant opposition; and, happily, the Service did not select this 
occasion to press for draconic administrative edict, judicial decision, 
or legislation as a response to real or imagined attempts to shrewdly 
circumvent the intended limitations on the deduction. During 
1963, representatives of the American Bar Association met at length 
with personnel in the National Office of the Service.49 The need for 
both an expression of guidelines for future drafting and a fair 
administrative solution permitting qualification under existing 
clauses was emphasized. From this setting, Rev. Proc. 64-19 
emerged as an example of the effectiveness of cooperative negotiation 
between representatives of the Bar and the Service to effectuate a 
rational accommodation between implementation of statutory pur-
pose and protection of taxpayers through adequate notification of 
the Treasury position and opportunity for compliance. The chair-
man of the Estate and Gift Tax Committee of the American Bar 
Association's Section of Taxation phrased it well: 
"While Revenue Procedure 64-19 certainly has its limita-
tions, it does carry out the primary goals sought by the members 
of the Tax and Probate Sections, namely, to alert lawyers across 
the country to the kind of pecuniary clause which causes the 
marital deduction clause to arise, to apprise them of means of 
curing the problem, and to provide a feasible administrative 
solution for presently existing wills containing the problem 
language. "50 
2. Scope 
Rev. Proc. 64-19 (to use the current shorthand term) deals only 
with a very narrow segment of the marital deduction area. It is 
49. Peter, supra note 11. 
50. Id. at 909. 
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addressed solely to the issue of qualification of pecuniary bequests 
for the federal estate tax marital deduction where the dispositive 
instrument contains "problem-pecuniary" language: a bequest of 
an amount, measurable in dollars (whether specifically set forth or 
determined by formula), which (I) is satisfiable in kind, (2) is 
satisfiable with assets which may be selected by the executor in his 
discretion, and( 3) where, in determining the amount to be trans-
ferred to the surviving spouse's share, such assets distributed in 
kind are to be valued at the value determined for federal estate 
purposes.111 It is clear that the Procedure does not purport to deal 
with income tax. problems arising in connection with such a bequest112 
and only obliquely treats gift tax considerations.113 Further, it ex-
plicitly states that the problem under consideration does not arise 
where the bequest consists of (1) a bequest of specific assets, or (2) "a 
fractional share of the estate under which each beneficiary shares 
proportionately in the appreciation or depreciation in the value of 
assets" to the time of distribution, or (3) a pecuniary bequest 
(whether of a stated amount or determinable by formula) if it can 
be satisfied only in cash or if the fiduciary has no discretion in the 
selection of assets to be distributed in kind, or (4) if assets distributed 
in kind are to be valued at distribution date values in determining 
the quantum to be transferred in satisfaction of the bequest.114 
II. THE PECUNIARY FORMULA IN THE LIGHT OF R.Ev. PROC. 64-19 
A. Dispositions Under the "Problem-Pecuniary" Language 
That Will Qualify 
Confining treatment to the "problem-pecuniary" dispositive pro-
vision, the Procedure first specifies those circumstances in which 
the pecuniary bequest or transfer will continue to qualify no matter 
when it was executed.115 Specifically, the deduction will be allowed 
when it is "clear" under either (a) applicable state law or (b) an 
express or implied provision of the instrument that the fiduciary, 
in satisfying the bequest, must distribute assets according to one 
and only one of the two following tests: 56 
51. Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 1, ·2.01. 
52. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.02. 
53. Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 3.01, 3.02, 5.01; see Lauritzen, supra note 26, at 274 • 
. 54. Rev. Proc 64-19, § 4.01 
55. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02. 
56. It- is essential to note that the dispositive instrument must limit the fiduciary 
to one of the alternative routes. If he might satisfy the bequest by a choice of either 
route, the pecuniary bequest will not be deemed to qualify under § 2.02 of Rev. 
Proc. 64-19. See Cohen, supra note 45. 
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(I) A quantum of assets having an aggregate fair market 
value at the date or dates of distribution amounting to no less 
than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer as finally 
determined for federal estate tax purposes (hereinafter referred 
to as the "minimum-value" test). 
(2) A quantum of assets fairly representative of apprecia-
tion or depreciation in the value of all property thus available 
for distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary bequest (here-
inafter referred to as the "ratable-sharing' test). 
Assuming that the dispositive instrument does not specify use of 
either of the alternative requirements, under what circumstances 
will it be "clear" that applicable state law will require one or the 
other of the requirements so that the disposition will qualify? In 
a recent speech, a high-ranking representative of the Internal Reve-
nue Service suggested that the disposition could qualify if an ap-
plicable statute so required or if there existed "a decision of the 
highest court in the state similar to that rendered in Estate of 
Kirchheimer, Ill. Probate Ct., Cook County, File No. 56 P 8017."57 
He also suggested that the deduction might be allowed if it could 
be established by the executor, "that the value of this interest can 
be determined as of the date of death and cannot subsequently be 
shifted by action of any other person. This might be done by show-
ing that the right to make the selection was in the surviving spouse 
or her est~te ... or, as in one instance, by showing that the residue 
[presumably referring to the source of satisfying the bequest] con-
sisted entirely of cash and insurance."58 
If, however, it is not clear that this type of result must flow, 
what will be the effect of problem-pecuniary language and what 
should be done? Discussion may be facilitated by first considering 
dispositive instruments executed prior to October I, 1964, and then 
turning attention to those executed after that date. 
I. Instruments Executed Prior to October 1, 1964 
a. Where Re-execution Is Impracticable or Impossible 
Even if it is not clear that the problem-pecuniary language 
will require either distribution of the specified minimum value or 
a ratable sharing of appreciation or depreciation, the marital deduc-
57. Speech by Mr. John Sheets, Estate and Gift Tax Branch, National Office, 
Internal Revenue Service, before the Chicago Bar Association, Dec. 1, 1964, as reported 
in FED. Esr. &: GIFT TAX REP. 1J 8147, at 7239 (1964). A slightly different version appears 
as Sheets, Practical Solutions to 61-19, 104- TRusrs &: EsrATES 71 (1965). The Kirchheimer 
case is discussed in Lauritzen, Marital Deduction Bequests-Current Problems and 
Drafting Suggestions, 8 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 125, 146 (1964). 
58. Sheets, supra note 57. 
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tion may still be obtained with respect to documents executed prior 
to October 1, 1964. The price of allowance, absent litigation,69 is 
the execution of appropriate agreements by both the fiduciary and 
the surviving spouse that assets available for distribution in satisfac-
tion of the bequest "will be so distributed between the marital 
deduction bequest or transfer in trust and the balance of the estate 
... that the cash or other property distributed in satisfaction of the 
marital-deduction pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust will be 
fairly representative of the net appreciation or depreciation in the 
value of the available property on the date or dates of distribution."60 
Section 5 of the Revenue Procedure sets forth forms of the required 
agreements. 61 
It will be noted that the agreement requires that the marital 
gift must share ratably in appreciation and depreciation; it does not 
include the other alternative of provision of a "minimum amount" 
equal in value to the marital deduction claimed for the property so 
passing.62 Firsthand hearsay suggests that originally representatives 
of the American Bar Association sought an agreement from the 
Service whereby the deduction would be allowed if agreements were 
signed specifying that the widow must receive property with a 
distribution date value at least equal to the marital deduction 
claimed. Opposition to this minimum-value approach, however, de-
veloped in the Chicago area, premised on the propositions (1) that 
this would require two valuations (a valuation at date of distribu-
tion as well as a valuation at date of death)63 and (2) that the entire 
risk of appreciation and depreciation would be shifted to the residu-
ary legatees, whose interests might be wiped out if asset values de-
clined drastically during administration. The Service pointed out 
that the Rev. Proc. would have to prescribe one route or the other; 
allowing the executor to choose between the ratable sharing or min-
59. The one case noted involving this precise question is Estate of Walsh v. Com• 
missioner, No. 3433-63, T.C., filed July 16, 1963. See Lauritzen, note 27 supra, at 396. 
60. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01. 
. 61. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 5.01 sets forth the form of agreement to be executed by the 
surviving spouse; § 5.02 sets forth the form of agreement to be executed by the 
executor or trustee. 
62. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 5. 
63. In the case of a ratable sharing provision that would permit distributions 
equal to the fractional share of the estate as determined for federal estate tax 
purposes, only one valuation is required (that being the valuation for federal estate 
tax purposes). In essence, this is the same as a fractional share of the residue type 
clause. As distinguished from a "true fractional share" disposition, however, the ratable-
sharing pecuniary does not require distribution of a fractional share of each item; 
rather, it is required only that the value of assets distributed result in ratable sharing. 
However, if assets are to be chosen to make up the required amount, it is obvious that 
a second valuation as of date of distribution will be necessary. 
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imum value routes in the light of hindsight derived from many 
months of administration would obviously make available the very 
type of discretionary action the Rev. Proc. forbade.64 In any event, 
the ultimate choice was the ratable-sharing pattern, and the agree-
ments to be signed provide only this route. 
The actual agreement required of the executor differs from that 
which the spouse must sign. The former must agree that he will 
make a distribution fitting the ratable-sharing pattern;65 the latter 
must agree only that if the property "accepted in full satisfaction 
of this bequest ... is not fairly representative of my proportionate 
share of any net appreciation in the value ... the difference in value 
will be treated as a transfer ... by gift ... and a Federal gift tax 
return ... filed if required."66 
Questions have been raised regarding the authority of the execu-
tor to sign the required agreement and the feasibility of securing 
agreement from the surviving spouse. But, though an able com-
mentator has expressed a contrary view,67 it seems that neither prob-
lem should be insurmountable.68 Surely the basic reason for includ-
ing the pecuniary formula in the will was to secure the maximum 
64. To illustrate the point, assume an adjusted gross estate of $1,000,000 at date of 
death with a maximum marital deduction of $500,000 to be provided. If the 
executor had a choice of routes and the property appreciated to $1,200,000, he might 
well satisfy the bequest with the "minimum value" of $500,000 (thus precluding 
the marital share from appreciation during administration); if, on the other hand, the 
estate declined to a value of $800,000, he might (absent fiduciary law doctrine to the 
contrary) satisfy the bequest with property worth $400,000, having chosen the 
ratable-sharing method in the light of hindsight. 
65. Section 5.02. He also agrees that "within six months after the final distribution 
of cash and other property in satisfaction of the marital deduction .•• I will file with 
the District Director .•• " schedules showing assets available to satisfy the bequest and 
those actually so used. § 5.02. 
66. Section 5.01. 
67. Lauritzen, supra note 27, at 320, 396; Lauritzen, supra note 26, at 249, 281 (lack 
of authority in executor and need to resort to court), 266 (the problems in securing the 
widow's agreement). See also Colson, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 
61-19, IO THE PRACTICAL LAw. 69, 78 (1964), suggesting that, "The validity of 
such agreements, however, depends upon local law .•• [and] it could be argued that 
the requisite agreements are contrary to the terms of the will, and, therefore, un-
enforceable, because, in effect, they require the executor to surrender his power to 
satisfy the pecuniary bequest by a cash distribution in the exact amount of the 
bequest." It has been suggested that the execution of the agreement by the executor, 
to protect the marital deduction's availability affects the interests of beneficiaries and 
leads to a conflict of interest. New York and Illinois attorneys who subscribe to this 
view have recommended that a court order be obtained authorizing or disapproving 
execution of the agreement. A contrary view was expressed by distinguished Pennsyl-
vania probate lawyers in sessions of the Pennsylvania State Bar Association meeting 
in Erie, in June 1964. Perhaps the mere existence of divergence of opinions suggests 
the presence of a "problem with agreements." 
68. See, e.g., Straus, Revenue Procedure 64-19-When Should Agreements Be Made?, 
103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 911 (1964); Revenue Procedure 61-19-Panel Discussion, 103 
TRUSTS & ESTATES 917,919 (1964) (a Straus-Lauritzen exchange of views). 
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marital deduction, and the testator's obvious intent (or that of his 
attorney) in granting the discretion to his executor was to minimize 
taxes. If the executor is required to distribute a marital share 
reflecting a pro rata allocation of appreciation and depreciation 
during administration, as the New York69 and Oregon70 cases have 
held, no agreement should be required. Only where he might be 
deemed to have discretion in this regard should the agreement be 
required,71 and, in these instances, signing the agreement and dis-
tributing accordinglY. would appear to be no more than the grant 
of discretion permitted. 
And what of the possibility that the widow might be unable or 
unwilling to sign the agreement? As to inability, a top official of the 
Service has expressed the opinion that "If the surviving spouse is 
incapable of signing an agreement, the Service will accept the signa-
ture of anyone who would be authorized to sign any other document 
requiring her signature when she or her estate would be bound by 
such agreement."72 
As to unwillingness, it has been suggested that the decedent might 
be "survived by a second wife who is not the mother of his children 
and where the relationship between the wife and children is far 
from amicable. Suppose, after her husband's death, she is told that 
unless she executes the required agreement, substantial additional 
taxes must be paid from the shares passing to her stepchildren. In 
such case, her reply might well be, 'How wonderful.' "73 This 
69. E.g., In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), afj'd mem., 
3 N.Y.2d 908, 145 N.E.2d 872 (1957); In the Matter of Estate of Inman, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 
196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct. 1959). The New York cases are collected and analyzed in a 
perceptive and excellent opinion by Surrogate Hildreth in In re Umpleby's Will, 
252 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1964). But may the testator specify that the executor may 
distribute assets so as to allocate appreciation to the nonmarital share, as under a 
"minimum-value" tax value clause? It has been suggested that the requirement of 
impartial allocation of appreciation "may be avoided by the testator indicating his 
desire that any distributions in kind be made with assets whose market value on the 
date of distribution does not exceed or exceeds by the smallest amount possible their 
income tax bases. Such language constitutes a clear waiver of the executor's duty to 
act impartially as between the beneficiaries." Covey, The Marital Deduction: Revenue 
Procedure 64-19 and Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317, 324 (1964); Covey discusses 
the statement in Bush, supra, suggesting that such a provision violates section 125(2) 
of the Decedent Estate Law, but argues that subsequent cases have held to the contrary, 
citing Inman, supra, and Matter of Nickelsburg, 34 Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1961). 
See Matter of McDonnell, 153 N.Y.L.J. No. 27, 18 (Nassau Co. Surr.) Feb. 9, 1965, where 
the duty of impartiality was held to require allocation of a pro rata share of apprecia-
tion to the marital share "in the absence of some indication by the testator that he 
intended to vest in his executives such far-reaching power to seriously affect, as in 
this case, the share of the widow." 
70. Nicolai v. Hoffman, 232 Ore. 105,373 P.2d 967 (1962). 
71. Straus, supra note 68, at 913, 914. 
72. Sheets, supra note 57; cf. Lauritzen, supra note 26, at 271. 
73. Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 103 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 536, 539 (1964); Panel Discussion, 
supra note 68, at 917. 
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assumes that the marital share bears no estate tax.es, a proposition 
which is not universally true absent an appropriate tax allocation 
clause in the dispositive instrument.74 (If her share bore an aliquot 
share of the estate tax, she would surely have an incentive to sign.75) 
In any event, it will be recalled that this discussion relates only to 
the "saving" of irremediable wills of pre-October 1, 1964, vintage; 
such situations should not arise where prophylactic redrafting is 
possible and assuredly will not arise under wills drawn since Octo-
ber 1, 1964. 
One further suggestion may be in order. Although the statute of 
limitations has not run on some estates in which the full marital 
deduction has been granted despite the dependence on problem-
pecuniary language, there has been no indication that the Service 
has been seeking to reopen such audited and cleared estates. If, 
perchance, a potential claim for refund in such an estate should come 
to light, it would seem but the better part of valor to consider the 
potential risks of raising the ghost of the problem-pecuniary language 
before filing any refund claim which might result in a deficiency 
rather than a recovery. 
b. Where Re-execution Is Possible 
In a great many cases, it will be possible to re-execute documents 
containing the problem-pecuniary language. This will not be neces-
sary where state law requires ratable sharing, as in New York.76 
74. A significant number of states (twenty-four) provide for apportionment of 
estate taxes absent any specific direction to the contrary in the dispositive instrument. 
See, e.g., MICH. Pun. Acrs No. 144 (1963), applicable to estates of decedents dying after 
Nov. 9, 1963, or after ninety days after adjournment of the legislature, whichever 
occurred later; New York: N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw § 124. The Michigan statute is 
discussed in 2 MICHIGAN PROBATE GUIDE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 436 (1964). A 
recent case involving a Michigan estate of earlier vintage, and discussing the Michigan 
situation is Old Kent Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 970 (W.D. 
Mich. 1964), (on appeal to 6th Cir.). The statutes are collected in FED. EsT. &: GIFT TAX 
REP. ,i 2490.16 (1964). Other states have no applicable statutory treatment, though in 
many of these states the courts have established relevant local law. For an earlier com-
prehensive treatment, see Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, Tax Coun-
selor's Q., June 1957, p. 55. For a recent case illustrating the necessity for careful 
drafting of tax allocation clauses and a pitfall to avoid, see Estate of Albert L. Rice, 
41 T.C. 344 (1963) (discretion to pay all taxes from the nonmarital share). The case 
is on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Recent cases are discussed 
in CASNER, EsrATE PLANNING, SUPPLEMENT 316-19 (1964). 
75. But, even granting the premise, it may be suggested again that the agreement 
is required only where the executor is not precluded from exercising discretion. Under 
these circumstances and again assuming the somewhat unlikely attitude of the widow, 
might not the executor exercise discretion so as to allocate the additional tax burden 
to the widow through judicious selection of distributable assets? And would a probate 
court be likely to upset the restoration of excess taxes to the residue? Perhaps gentle 
suasion, in the form of reflective suggestion of this possibility, would have a salutary 
effect on the spiteful widow posited by the example. 
76. See Private Ruling, Letter from Lester H. Wallace, Acting Chief, Estate and 
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However, in states where the law is not clear, at least two choices are 
available. 
On the one hand, the counselor may feel it appropriate to rely 
on the execution of agreements, preferring not to disturb the exist-
ing will. This will be particularly appealing where the mental con-
dition of the testator has declined since the document was executed. 
In most cases, however, the balance seems to weigh in favor of 
executing an amendment, codicil, or new instrument.77 The mere 
fact that competent practitioners have raised questions concerning 
the authority of the fiduciary to execute the required agreement 
should give pause where alternative, safer corridors are available. 
Furthermore, there is authority for the proposition that a will and 
its codicils are construed as having been executed on the date of the 
last codicil.78 Thus, execution of any codicil after October 1, 
1964, to a pre-October 1, 1964, dispositive instrument without 
modification of the problem-pecuniary language might bring the 
instrument squarely within the thrust of section 2.03 of the Rev. 
Proc., which disqualifies post-September 30, 1964, problem-pecuniary 
dispositions that are not clearly subject to the minimum-value or 
ratable-sharing requirements. 
2. Instruments Executed Subsequent to September 30, 1964 
The stated position of the Service is that a pecuniary bequest 
that specifies the use of federal estate tax values in determining the 
quantum of assets to be selected by the executor to satisfy the 
bequest•will qualify for the marital deduction only if it satisfies the 
minimum-value or ratable-sharing test. Both new instruments ex-
ecuted after September 30, 1964, and amendments of existing instru-
ments after that date must conform to these requirements if tax-
value clauses of the type specified are to qualify for the deduction. 
Comparison of the various types of tax-value clauses may be useful 
in determining which, if any, to use. 
Gift Tax Branch, I.R.S., to Fiduciary Trust Co. of N.Y., P·H FEDERAL TAXES ,I 142051, 
at 7242 (1965). 
77. This does not overlook the "practical problems" of determining what the 
"appropriate" approach to the client is and whether to charge him for redrafting the 
instrument. As to the former, the Canons of Ethics impose no barrier. See Opinion 210 
(1942), approving the propriety of contacting the client where there has been a change 
in fact or in law which makes a change in the will, drawn by the lawyer, desirable. 
See also Opinion 21!! (1941). OPINIONS OF THE COMMI'ITEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
GRIEVANCES. (1957 ed.) 
78. E.g., Estate of Challman, 127 Cal. App. 2d 736, 274 P.2d 439 (1954): Jackman v. 
Kasper, 393 III. 496, 66 N.E.2d 678 (1946); Spangenberg Estate, 359 Pa. 353, 59 A.2d 103 
(1948). 
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For purposes of illustration, consider the earlier example of 
the estate subject to a dispositive clause containing the problem-
pecuniary language, with an adjusted gross estate for federal estate 
tax purposes of 1,000,000 dollars composed of 5,000 shares of A stock 
and 5,000 shares of B stock, each with a federal estate tax value and 
basis of 500,000 dollars and all included in the probate estate. At 
distribution date, the A stock has a fair market value of 800,000 
dollars and the B stock is worth 400,000 dollars. 
a. Operation of Minimum-Value Clauses 
If the governing instrument specifically provides (and a number 
of draftsmen have so provided in recent years) that assets distributed 
in satisfaction of the marital bequest shall have a distribution date 
value of not less than the marital deduction allowable, the transfer 
should qualify for the marital deduction. Absent a local law require-
ment of ratable sharing in appreciation of assets during administra-
tion, the executor may distribute all of the A stock, thus complying 
with the donor's direction, qualifying for the marital deduction, 
and, presumably, incurring no capital gain to be reported on the 
estate's income tax return.79 A tax-oriented executor might distribute 
one-fourth of the A stock (basis 125,000 dollars and fair market value 
200,000 dollars) and three-fourths of the B stock (basis 375,000 dol-
lars and current value 300,000 dollars).80 
In similar manner, the minimum-value clause described above 
will qualify and implementation will follow similar principles when 
there is an overall diminution in the value of assets during adminis-
tration. For example, assume that the A stock appreciated to 550,000 
dollars while the B stock declined to 300,000 dollars. In complying 
with the bequest, the executor might distribute four-fifths of the A 
79. Such an exercise of discretion might, however, be deemed a violation of the 
normal fiduciary duty of impartiality if such a duty is deemed imposed despite the 
terms of the will. See Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919). Certainly, 
he would be ill-advised to make such a distribution unless the will clearly indicated 
that he had the authority to prefer one or the other of the several beneficiaries. When 
the surviving spouse is both a fiduciary and the preferred legatee, courts may be 
expected to take a rather dim view of the proceeding. See In re Bush's Will, 2 App. 
Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956). 
80. The mathematics for the "ratio" distribution are as follows: The ratio of the 
appreciation of A stock values ($300,000) to B stock diminution ($100,000) is three to 
one; therefore, the executor distributes ¼ of the A stock and ¼ of the B stock to the 
marital share. To further illustrate the principle, assume that the ratio of the A 
stock's appreciated value ($800,000) to the B stock's decline ($200,000) is eight to two; 
therefore, the executor will distribute 2/10 of the A stock (basis of $100,000 and fair 
market value of $260,000) and 8/10 of the B stock (basis $400,000 and fair market 
value $240,000) to the marital trust. The assets distributed have an aggregate basis of 
$500,000 and an aggregate distribution date value of $500,000. 
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stock (basis 400,000 dollars and fair market value of 440,000 dollars) 
and one-fifth of the B stock (basis 100,000 dollars and current value 
of 60,000 dollars), satisfying both the testamentary instruction and 
the requirement set forth in the Procedure. Again there should be 
no recognized gain or loss to either the spouse or the estate. 
b. Operation of Ratable-Sharing Clauses 
If either the governing instrument or applicable local law clearly 
requires that the share allocated to the surviving spouse be fairly 
representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of prop-
erty available for distribution in satisfaction of the marital bequest, 
the share similarly will qualify for the marital deduction.81 In carry-
ing out such a direction (using our original hypothetical estate), 
the executor presumably should distribute property having an ag-
gregate value at distribution date of at least 600,000 dollars. He 
might distribute one-half of the A stock (basis 250,000 dollars and 
current value 400,000 dollars) and one-half of the B stock (basis 
250,000 dollars and current value 200,000 dollars). 
Could the executor transfer all of the A stock (fair market value 
of 800,000 dollars) to the widow in satisfaction of the marital bequest 
under a clause qualifying under the appreciation-depreciation pro-
vision of the Procedure? Under the problem-pecuniary language, 
the executor had the right to satisfy the bequest in kind with selected 
assets having a basis equal to the marital deduction claimed; choice 
of the A stock would meet these specifications. (This would also be 
true where the dispositive language or local law simply required 
that the distribution date value of assets distributed be at least equal 
to the marital deduction allowable with respect to them, absent any 
requirement of the instrument or local law that beneficiaries share 
ratably in appreciation and depreciation during administration.) 
It will be recalled, however, that absent a minimum-value require-
ment, qualification must follow the appreciation-depreciation pat-
tern, and the traditional problem-pecuniary language must have 
been augmented either by an additional provision reading, for 
example, "The assets to be distributed in satisfaction of said bequest 
shall be selected in such manner that the cash and other property 
distributed shall have an aggregate fair market value fairly rep-
resentative of the distributee's proportionate share of the apprecia-
tion or depreciation in the value to the date, or dates, of distribution 
of all property then available for distribution,"82 or by a clear local 
81. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02. 
82. The language closely follows that used in Rev. Proc. 64-19. 
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law requirement of such result. This ratable-sharing requirement 
would seem to limit the assets chosen to a distribution date value 
of 600,000 dollars.s3 
The question may now be posed as to whether there is any real 
difference between the new "ratable-sharing pecuniary" and a 
straight fractional share formula clause. Economically, each results 
in a marital share of 600,000 dollars. Theoretically, however, there 
are several differences. 
The pecuniary sets no requirement that the marital share include 
a ratable share of each asset; conceivably, the marital share can be 
carved out, as a bequest, utilizing selected assets. Yet the new pecu-
niary clause imposes concurrent requirements which may tax the 
ingenuity of the executor. The marital deduction is fixed at 500,000 
dollars, and the dispositive clause specifies that the marital bequest 
shall be satisfied with assets having an aggregate estate tax value or 
other basis equal to that amount. The newly added ratable-sharing 
requirement sets the distribution date value at 600,000 dollars. Thus 
the executor apparently must select assets with an aggregate estate 
tax value of 500,000 dollars and an aggregate distribution date value 
of 600,000 dollars-a challenging matching job to say the least if 
selection of individual assets, rather than an allocation of a fractional 
share of each, is sought.84 
In the example which has been used, no combination of distribu-
tions other than an equal splitting of the A and B stock will fit the 
specifications. This does not mean, however, that a selection of assets 
is impossible in other situations. Suppose, for example, that the 
adjusted gross estate had been 1,000,000 dollars and that available 
assets had been 2,500 shares of W, 2,500 shares of X, 2,500 shares of 
Y, and 2,500 shares of Z, each having a federal estate tax value of 100 
dollars per share. Further assume that the W and X shares were each 
worth 160 dollars per share at the distribution date while the Y and 
Z shares had a fair market value of 80 dollars each at that time. 
Clearly, the executor could comply by distributing all of the Wand 
z shares or all of the X and Y shares to the surviving spouse. 
83. For illustrative purposes, it is assumed in the text that the distribution carries 
a proportionate share of appreciation or depreciation. The language used, "fairly 
representative," would not seem to require precise allocation; yet the words are not 
free from ambiguity, and the executor will probably be well-advised to come as close 
as possible within the limits of practicality. If there is to be deviation from exact 
allocation of appreciation or depreciation, it probably should be in favor of the 
marital share. 
84. To the extent that "fairly representative" permits modest deviation in the 
interest of practical administration, the "challenge" is eased. The same is true 
where modest overfunding of the marital share seems appropriate and the 
acquiescence of other interested beneficiaries can be secured. 
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Realistically, however, neatly designed hypothetical situations of 
this type will rarely occur and, as a practical matter, a distribution 
of a fractional share of each class of stock will be required. 85 
A further possibility arises. Might not the executor meet the 
requirements by selling sufficient shares to produce 600,000 dollars 
in cash?86 The quoted will provision and the requirements of Rev. 
Proc. 64-19 would not seem to inhibit such a course of action, the 
rationale underlying the requirement of ratable sharing would seem 
to be satisfied, and opportunity for manipulation would appear to 
be nonexistent. However, one of the purposes of the pecuniary clause 
permitting distribution in kind, namely, the transfer of specific 
assets without the necessity of liquidation and without concomitant 
expense and possible gain and loss to the estate on disposition, would 
be lost. In short, the executor will often be faced, at best, with a 
choice bet1veen distributing a pro-rata share of each asset similar 
to the operation of the fractional share clause or making distribu-
tion in cash subject to the provision that the widow's portion share 
in appreciation and depreciation of estate assets prior to distribution 
with an economic result similar to a distribution of a fractional share. 
c. Minimum-Value Versus Ratable-Sharing as a Means of Qualifying 
Tax-Value Clauses Under Rev. Proc. 64-19 
If local law neither requires the fiduciary to give the surviving 
spouse a minimum amount equivalent to the allowable marital 
deduction nor requires that her distributive share be "fairly rep-
resentative" of appreciation and depreciation during administration 
and if the draftsman should decide to utilize a pecuniary clause 
embodying the problem-pecuniary language, then, which of the two 
alternatives set forth in Rev. Proc. 64-19 would appear to be 
preferable? (Obviously, if local law clearly requires that the widow 
share ratably in appreciation or depreciation, despite a grant of 
discretion to the trustee subject only to a requirement of a minimum 
distribution date value, the minimum value route will not be 
chosen.) 
In essence, the basic choice is between assuring the widow of a 
85. Other possibilities may arise. For example, the estate may contain corporate 
stock plus equal amounts of municipal bonds and high-yielding corporate bonds. If 
bond values do not change, it may be possible to assign the municipals to the marital 
share, an appropriate amount of the industrials to the nonmarital share, and then to 
split the stock and remaining assets fractionally in order to comply with the twin 
requirements of the ratable-sharing route. 
86. In New York, absent authority to distribute in kind, he apparently must 
distribute in cash. See In re Umpleby's Will, 252 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1964). The 
result does not follow in all states. See note 167 infra. 
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"fixed amount" (limiting the legatee's participation in appreciation 
or depreciation occurring prior to distribution) and qualifying a 
marital portion which shares ratably in appreciation and deprecia-
tion in a manner similar to that of the traditional fractional share 
of the residue clause. 
It will be recalled that, during the negotiations leading to Rev. 
Proc. 64-19, one group of practitioners opposed establishment of the 
assured minimum-value method on the ground that it was unfair, 
undesirable, and perhaps a violation of local law to prefer the 
widow's share, particularly when drastic depreciation of assets during 
administration might virtually wipe out the interest of other resid-
uary beneficiaries. On the other hand, it seems logical that the 
testator would normally and naturally prefer the surviving spouse 
to residuary legatees and, absent a very large estate in which over-
qualification was clearly undesirable, would prefer that the widow's 
share be protected. Thus, if some minimum for both the widow and 
other legatees is desirable, these should be provided for by fixed 
amount pecuniary bequests to each, antecedent to the formula 
clause.87 In the more likely situation of overall appreciation during 
administration (and economic history seems to suggest that inflation, 
whether slow or galloping, seems to have become a way of life), the 
minimum-value clause does permit the executor to choose those 
assets less likely to appreciate (or to produce maximal income) and 
to allocate them in satisfaction of the marital bequest. The only new 
requirement under Rev. Proc. 64-19 is that the distribution have a 
fair market value equivalent to the marital deduction allowable 
with respect to such assets-a fair condition to avoid the possible 
manipulation which triggered the promulgation of the Procedure. 
This discretion granted to the trustee-to determine the nature 
and value of assets allocable to the marital share (subject only to the 
minimum bench mark)-will have much of the appeal which led to 
the widespread use of the pecuniary clause. But, for those who look 
upon this discretion to vary the widow's share as an undesirable 
potential source of administration problems stemming from compet-
ing interests of the widow and the residuary legatees, the considera-
tions are quite similar to those which led to avoidance of the 
pecuniary formula clause before the emergence of the problems 
which gave rise to Rev. Proc. 64-19. 
87. The bequest might either be an outright general pecuniary legacy (carrying no 
share in income during the normal period required for distribution) or a legacy in 
trust (entitled to a share of income, usually). The right to income should be con-
sidered and specifically provided. See Report of Committee on Probate and Estate 
Administration, 102 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 916 (1963). 
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From an administrative standpoint, the minimum-value type 
clause appears to present fewer undesirable features, such as mechani-
cal problems and potential expense stemming from liquidation to 
satisfy the bequest in cash, than does the ratable-sharing alternative. 
The latter, at best, seems likely in normal circumstances to present 
the same type of distribution and administration problems inherent 
in the traditional fractional share clause.88 This ratable-sharing 
pecuniary, as a newly developed hybrid (to use a more polite term 
than another which comes readily to mind), simply presents a new 
form of clause for local courts to interpret;89 though pecuniary in 
appearance, it apparently will be treated by the Service as a fractional 
share which it so closely resembles.90 In short, the appreciation-
depreciation formula appears to offer few, if any, attractions when 
compared to the fractional share formula-and a voyage of explora-
tion seems somewhat inappropriate.91 
While this analysis would seem to suggest the relative desirability 
of the minimum-value clause vis-a-vis the ratable sharing alternative, 
the choice is obviously, and happily, not limited to the two. As will 
be suggested, the "true pecuniary" (a pecuniary bequest which will 
be satisfied with assets valued as of distribution date) will often be 
preferable to either, when potential recognition of gain is not of 
controlling importance. 
Beyond this, it is possible to speculate on alternatives imag-
inative scriveners may devise. In addition, it seems reasonable to 
consider whether some selected species of fractional share clause 
might not be preferable. Pursued further, it would be appropriate 
to consider whether any form of formula bequest is really worth the 
candle and, if so, how the dangers and problems which seem to arise 
can be minimized by an appropriate specific allocation of certain 
assets to the marital and nonmarital shares, respectively, with the 
formula merely performing the function of a "back-up" clause and 
probably affecting a relatively small quantum of the estate absent 
88. These problems are considered in the discussion of fractional share clauses. 
See Part III of this article infra. 
89. The difficulties of coping with formula clauses and appropriately classifying 
them are collected and analyzed in Straus, supra note 68, at 912; see Durand, Planning 
Lessons From Marital Deduction Litigation, 101 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 8 (1962). 
90. See Sheets, supra note 57, at 72: "The construction adopted by Rev. Proc. 64-19 
treats bequests covered by its provisions as bequests of fractional shares. Therefore, any 
intermediate, disproportionate distribution of any significance would require a 
revaluation of the property and an adjustment of the fraction." 
91. "In working out an estate plan a lawyer should not try to skate successfully 
over thin ice but should confine himself to places where the ice is abundantly 
thick •••• " TWEED &: PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY EsrATE PLANNING 2 (1959 
rev. ed.). 
March 1965] Marital Deduction Formula Clauses 833 
significant change in the makeup and value of estate assets. These 
latter questions are considered in the closing portion of this article. 
B. Possible New Pecuniary Tax-Value Formulas To Avoid 
the Problems Involved in Rev. Proc. 64-19 
The imagination and ingenuity of the American will draftsman 
in developing new formula approaches is legendary. 
One such formula that appeared even before issuance of Rev. 
Proc. 64-19 utilizes the traditional problem-pecuniary language, but 
adds that values used shall be the lower of (I) federal estate tax 
values or (2) fair market value at the time of distribution. A typical 
clause reads: "Allocations of property to the marital trust may be 
made in the executor's discretion wholly or partly in kind, by allocat-
ing specific assets, or undivided interests therein, at values as finally 
determined for Federal estate tax purposes OR the values current at 
the time of distribution, whichever shall be LOWER."92 
Such a clause "should" avoid the problems which gave rise to 
Rev. Proc. 64-19, since it is clear from the instrument that the 
distribution date value of the assets so distributed cannot be less 
than the marital deduction allowed with respect to such assets. Yet 
it would appear to have distinct disadvantages. While setting the 
allowable marital deduction as the minimum quantum for distribu-
tion to the marital share, it makes possible a sharing of appreciation, 
but not depreciation, by the marital share. 
Again returning to the example of A and B stock, the executor 
might, absent imposition of specific dispositive direction or local 
law requirement of ratable sharing of appreciation and deprecia-
tion, distribute all of the A stock, thus passing all appreciation to 
the widow. If he chose to fund the bequest with B stock, however, 
its value for distribution purposes would be 400,000 dollars (fair 
market value being lower than the federal estate tax value of 
500,000 dollars) and some distribution of A stock would be required. 
At this point, an interpretative problem arises in connection 
with the language used in the illustrative clause. If the direction is 
deemed to require that each asset distributed shall, for purposes of 
computing the required distribution, be valued at the lower of the 
two specified values, then an additional 1,000 shares of A stock 
92. This clause is taken from a form of a well-known bank. Suggestions for this 
type of clause have appeared elsewhere; references are set forth in Report of Subcom-
mittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, 102 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 934, 944 
n.70 (1963). See also Covey, The Marital Deduction and the Use of Formula Provisions, 
P-H WILLS-TRUSTS-ESTATE PLANNING FORMS 1J 121, at 291 (1962). This type of clause is 
criticized in Dane, Marital Deduction Questions, 103 TRUSTS &: ESTATE 112, 114 (1964). 
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(federal estate tax value of 100,000 dollars being lower than the fair 
market value of 160,000 dollars) would also be distributed to the 
marital share. 
If the executor were inclined toward a ratable distribution of 
shares, he would encounter difficulties when a clause is so inter-
preted. A distribution of one-half of the A stock (2,500 shares) 
would be valued at 250,000 dollars (the federal estate tax value of 
250,000 dollars being lower than the fair market value of 500,000 
dollars), while a distribution of the B stock would be valued at 
200,000 dollars (the fair market value of 200,000 dollars being 
lower than the federal estate tax value of 250,000 dollars). Since 
the bequest calls for 500,000 dollars, additional assets would have 
to be transferred. 93 
If the clause were revised to make clear that it referred to the 
lower of the aggregate federal estate tax value or fair market value 
at distribution, the result would be somewhat different in the second 
and third examples. In the second case, use of all of the B stock 
would require only 625 additional shares of A stock (basis of 62,500 
dollars and fair market value of 100,000 dollars) since the aggregate 
fair market value (400,000 dollars for B and 100,000 dollars for A) 
was lower than the aggregate federal estate tax value of the assets 
distributed (500,000 dollars for B and 62,500 dollars for A). In the 
third case, a distribution of half of the A shares and half of the B 
shares would be appropriate, since the aggregate federal estate tax 
value (250,000 dollars each for A and B shares) would be less than 
the aggregate fair market value (400,000 dollars for the A shares and 
200,000 dollars for the B shares). 
A fourth case will illustrate the built-in requirement that assets 
distributed must have a fair market value at least equal to the 
allowable marital deduction and that the full brunt of any decline 
93. The mathematics and fraction of shares distributed might prove a bit dis-
couraging. For example, in the hypothetical case, strict adherence to the formula 
would suggest distribution of 2,777.80 shares of A stock with a basis of $277,780 (which 
is lower than fair market value) and 2,777.80 shares of B stock with a distribution 
date value of $222,220 (actually $222,224) which is lower than the basis of $277,780. 
Where numerous assets are involved, a bit of thought should suggest the desirability 
of revising the clause to make clear that only the lower of aggregate fair market value 
or federal estate tax value is intended. In Matter of McDonnell, 153 N.Y.L.J. No. 27, 18 
(Nassau Co. Surr. Ct.) Feb. 9, 1965, the formula clause provided, " •.. each item of 
property •.• distributed in kind shall be valued at -the date or dates of such distribu-
tion or at the value determined therefor in the Federal estate tax proceeding in 
my estate, whichever value shall be lower." Surrogate Bennett, noting that the execu-
tors proposed to satisfy the legacy in cash in the amount of the marital deduction 
allowed, held that "executors may not satisfy the amount of the marital trust in cash 
without adding to such bequest its proportionate share in the appreciation realized 
by the estate." Ibid. 
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in overall values will be borne by the nonmarital share. For example, 
assume that the A stock had appreciated to 110 dollars per share 
(or a total of 550,000 dollars) while the B stock had declined in value 
to 60 dollars per share (or a total of 300,000 dollars). Assuming an 
absence of any requirement of sharing in appreciation and deprecia-
tion, a distribution of the A shares would require distribution of all 
5,000 shares (the federal estate tax value of 500,000 dollars being 
less than the fair market value of 550,000 dollars) in order to match 
values determined for distribution purposes with the 500,000 dollar 
amount due. 
On the other hand, an attempt to allocate all of the B shares 
(federal estate tax value 500,000 dollars and current value 300,000 
dollars) to the marital share would also require distribution of 
1,818.18 shares of A stock (current value of 200,000 dollars and 
federal estate tax value of 181,818 dollars) since the aggregate current 
value of the A and B shares distributed (500,000 dollars) is less than 
their aggregate federal estate tax value (681,818 dollars). Should 
the trustee consider a pro-rata distribution of shares, it is clear that, 
since the current value of half of each group of shares (275,000 
dollars for A and 150,000 dollars for B, or a total of 425,000 dollars) 
is less than the 500,000 dollar federal estate tax valuation of the 
shares, the formula would require that additional shares be added 
to the marital transfer. This might be 441.176 shares each of the 
A stock and B stock (with a fair market value of 75,000 dollars and 
federal estate tax value of 88,235.20 dollars), thus transferring assets 
valued at the lower aggregate fair market value of 500,000 dollars 
as compared to total federal estate tax values of 588,235.20 dollars. 
Perhaps this brief illustration of the operation of this type clause 
will at least give pause to those who have been considering its use. 
III. THE FRACTIONAL SHARE AS AN ALTERNATIVE CLAUSE 
Limitations of space and the shortness of life preclude full ex-
ploration herein of the fractional share formula clause in its infinite 
variations. Suffice it to say that varying patterns for expressing the 
fractional share have developed, and debate over the preferable 
method has not ended.94 Yet it is not to be gainsaid that the frac-
94. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 73; Kiley &: Golden, The Residue Formula as 
an Aid to the Executor, 90 TRusrs &: EsrATES 824 (1951); Kiley &: Golden, A Residue 
Formula for Maximum Marital Deduction, 89 TRUST &: ESTATES 744 (1950). Cf. Bolte, 
Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. REY. 532 (1961); Durbin, 
Marital Deduction Formula Revisited, 102 TRusrs &: ESTATES 545 (1963). And see gen-
erally Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15TII INST. ON Fm. 
TAX. 909 (1957); Craven, Marital Deduction Problems-Use of the Pert:entage Formula 
Clause, N.Y.U. 19TII INST. ON Fm. TAX. 613 (1961). 
836 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:809 
tional share formula has been the favorite of corporate fiduciaries,911 
and at least one report of the Committee on Estate and Tax Planning 
of the American Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Probate 
and Trust Law has indicated a preference for it.96 A more recent 
report of that Committee suggested that until "the questions recently 
raised by the Internal Revenue Service have been put to rest, it would 
seem that the fractional share of the residue type of formula clause 
has fewer pitfalls and is the safer to use of the two types of for-
mulas. "97 And, almost as if in vindication, it has been observed that 
recent events have "increased the popular appeals of the fractional 
share of the residue clause."98 
Yet it may be noted that, while Rev. Proc. 64-19 does set forth 
the Service's current position on tax-value pecuniary formula clauses, 
it does not (as it need not have) express approval of all fractional 
share clauses as such.99 Rather, it simply indicates that the problems 
giving rise to Rev. Proc. 64-19 are not present in fractional share 
dispositions "under which each beneficiary shares proportionately 
in the appreciation or depreciation in the value of assets to the 
date ... of distribution."1oo 
A quick glance at the methods of expressing the fractional 
share clause and at a few of the potential problems arising in its 
administration may furnish some basis for deciding whether, and 
when, such a clause is to be preferred to the pecuniary formula. 
A rather simple, indeed atypically simple, example may be useful 
by way of illustration. 
A. The Fractional Share Illustrative Case 
The will of the hypothetical client is to specify that all expenses, 
debts, and taxes are to be paid from, and borne by, assets other 
than those comprising the marital share;101 it is to provide further 
95. See Bronston, State and Federal Taxation-Tax Problems of Formula Type 
of Marital Deduction Bequest, 96 TRusrs &: EsrATES 887 (1957); Lovell, Administering 
the Marital Deduction-A Summary of Five Years' Experience, 92 TRusrs &: EsrATES 
812, 813 (1953). 
96. Durand, Draftsmanship-Wills and Trusts, 96 Thusrs &: EsrATES 871, 873 
(1957). 
97. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 92, at 945. See also Durbin, supra note 94. 
98. Lloyd, Revenue Procedure 64-19, Background of Drafting Problems, 103 TRUSTS 
&: EsrATES 898, 899 (1964). 
99. Ibid. 
100. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(1). 
IOI. This dispositive direction is deliberately phrased in ambiguous language for 
illustrative purposes. As will be noted in the text, several alternatives are possible, and 
the draftsman should obtain a more specific directive after consideration has been 
given to the ramifications of the several choices. For example: (I) Normally an early 
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that the executor may waive any rights to reimbursement for taxes 
attributable to non-probate assets.102 The testator desires to bequeath 
50,000 dollars to a friend, Able, and further desires that the maxi-
mum marital deduction be obtained by placing such share103 of 
the estate as is necessary to achieve that result in a marital trust A 
for the benefit of his wife,104 she to have all of the income for life 
paragraph of the will contains a direction to pay debts, funeral expenses, and expenses 
of administration. In addition, pecuniary legacies will be provided for in an early 
paragraph of the will and will take precedence over dispositions of the residue. Thus 
the fractional share to be qualified for the marital deduction will, in those 
circumstances, allocate only a share of the probate estate remaining after provision 
for the debts, expenses, and legacies. Further, (2) payment of succession taxes, though 
they are to be paid from other than the marital share, may be subject to two quite 
different types of direction. On the one hand, the testator may direct payment of such 
taxes (as an administration expense) prior to determination of the residue from which 
the fractional marital share is to be carved. See Golden, supra note 73, at 538; Kiley &: 
Golden, supra note 94, at 746. To some, defining the fraction after taxes seems most 
logical, since the fraction is then applied to the "true residue." See Bolte, supra note 
94, at 543. For a discussion of the operation of the "pre-tax" residue pattern, see Casner, 
How To Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 190, 191 
(1960). Adequate specification is essential; absent such specification a construction 
problem may be presented. E.g., Matter of Milholland, 31 Misc. 2d 1046, 221 N.Y.S.2d 
199 (Surr. Ct. 1961). 
102. See I.R.C., §§ 2206, 2207. 
103. If the formula is to be a fractional share, it seems prudent to express it in 
those terms and not in terms of a "portion," a "percentage," or other potentially 
ambiguous terms which could (however illogically) be construed as giving the widow an 
amount equal to the formula-derived sum. For example, in In the Matter of Estate of 
Kantner, 50 N.J. Super. 582, 143 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1958), the gift was "a portion 
of my estate equal in value to (a) one-half of the value of my adjusted gross estate," 
followed by a disposition of the residue in a succeeding clause; it was construed as a 
general pecuniary bequest. In Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 172 A.2d 146 (1961), the 
lower court construed a bequest of "so much of my estate [as] ... shall equal the 
maximum marital deduction" to be a gift of a fractional share; the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held the bequest to be a pecuniary gift, stressing that the marital 
trust was created in a separate paragraph prior to the disposition of the residue. Id. 
at 414, 172 A.2d at 147. These cases are discussed in Lauritzen, Marital Deduction 
Bequests-Current Problems and Drafting Suggestions, 8 TAX CouNSELOR's Q. 125, 
141 (1964). The numerous New York cases construing formula language are collected 
and discussed by Surrogate Hildreth in In re Umpleby's Will, 252 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. 
Ct. 1964). 
104. Here again, the testator has a number of alternatives. He might leave the 
property to his wife by an outright bequest or by a gift to be qualified under I.R.C., 
§ 2056(b)(5) (either a legal life estate or gift in trust), giving her all of the income for 
life with a general power of appointment exercisable in all events. Alternatively, he 
might provide for an "estate trust" in which income distributions to the widow 
would be discretionary but any undistributed income and principal would have to be 
distributed to her estate. The tax and non-tax factors influencing the choice are 
discussed in Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, Tax 
Counselor's Q., June 1959, pp. 1, 36-41. Once the choice has been made, it becomes 
important to consider the probate rules, or lack thereof, governing payment of 
income or interest on a bequest during the period of administration. The matter is 
discussed in detail in Report of Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, 
supra note 87. In general, the outright pecuniary legacy would not be entitled to 
income during the normal period of administration, but would receive interest 
where payment was delayed beyond that time (say, one year); the legacy in trust would, 
however, share in income, though the degree may be uncertain. These are matters 
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from Trust A coupled with a testamentary power of appointment.105 
The balance of the estate is to be placed in a second trust, Trust B, 
the income of which is to be paid to the wife,106 with remainder 
to specified remaindermen. Let it be further assumed that the 
executor does not elect the alternative valuation date, that funeral 
expenses and debts amount to 30,000 dollars, and that adminis-
tration expenses aggregate 50,000 dollars, all of which are taken as 
deductions for federal estate tax purposes.107 The anatomy of the 
estate is set out in Chart I on page 839. 
to be considered and specifically provided for in the dispositive instrument in accord-
ance with the testator's wishes. 
105. The life-estate coupled with a general power of appointment and designed 
to qualify under the specific requirements of I.R.C., § 2056(b)(5) is perhaps the most 
commonly used provision. Again, a knowledge of local law is essential if the deduc-
tion is not to be lost. In Estate of Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 
1964), the testator's will provided for creation of a trust with all income payable to 
the widow for life and on her death the remaining principal to "be paid over free 
of this Trust in such manner and proportions as my said wife may designate and 
appoint in her Last Will ••.• " Id. at 279. While the disposition appears to be a 
classic qualifying gift under § 2056(b)(5), both the Tax Court and the court of appeals 
held that under governing Maryland law the general power of appointment is "a 
rather strange animal ..• a creature apart from the general power of appointment 
found in the other states"; the trust did not qualify under § 2056(b)(5) because the 
widow could not appoint the trust property to her own estate. 
106. The provision for distribution of all income from both the marital trust A 
and residuary trust B will simplify the problems of administration, particularly if it is 
coupled with a provision that income received on account of assets later used to pay 
taxes, administration expenses, and the like is to be treated as income in accord 
with the modem trend. See discussion in text accompanying note 141 infra. If the 
wife is to receive only the income from Trust A, the trustee is faced with the problem 
of allocating the appropriate share of income even though the determinative fraction 
may not be ascertainable until federal estate tax values have been finally determined. 
Failure to allocate a proper share of income to the testamentary § 2056(b)(5) type 
marital trust should not endanger the marital deduction, since Rev. Reg. 20.2056(b)-
5(f)(9) specifically provides that, "An interest is not to be regarded as failing to satisfy 
the conditions ••. (that the spouse be entitled to all the income and that it be payable 
annually or more frequently) merely because the spouse is not entitled to the income 
from estate assets for the period before distribution of those assets by the executor, 
unless the executor is, by the decedent's will, authorized or directed to delay distribu-
tion beyond the period reasonably required for administration of the decedent's estate." 
When the trust is carved out of an inter vivas trust, however, it may be prudent to 
permit discretionary distributions of income from the non-qualifying residuary trust B 
in order to assure compliance without need for later adjustment of the respective 
income shares. For a discussion of carving the fractional share marital gift out of an 
inter vivos trust, see 1 CAsNER, EsrATE PLANNING 801-03 (3d ed. 1961). Although the 
point has been raised, it would seem that division of the trust into marital and non-
marital trusts according to a true fractional share provision should not give rise to 
recognition of gain or loss. One commentator suggests that the same should be true 
if a true pecuniary formula is used. Dane, supra note 92, at ll4; but for a contrary 
view, see Covey, supra note 69, at 320. 
107. For a discussion of the problems arising from the election to take certain 
expenses as deductions under either § 642(g) or under §§ 2053 and 2054, and methods 
of finessing the problem, see Polasky, supra note 104, at 6-17, and authorities cited 
therein. Later cases include In re McTamahan's Estate, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 
618 (1960). An illustration is set out at note 154 infra. Recently enacted New York 
Assets Includable in Gross Estate 
Life Insurance (interest payable 
to the widow for life under 
an option; non-qualifying 
terminable interest) 
Life Insurance (qualified for 
the marital deduction) 
Residence, joint tenancy (qualified) 
Cash (savings account in decedent's name) 
Stock A (3,000 shares) 
Stock B (3,000 shares) 
Stock C (3,000 shares) 
Income During First Year 
{
Date of Death 
Totals One Year Later 
CHART I 









Fair Market Value at: 
Date of One Year 
Death Later 
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The computation of the maximum estate tax marital deduction 





Adjusted Gross Estate 
Maximum Marital Deduction 







Assume that the problem, as the attorney sees it, is to draft dis-
positive provisions which will direct the executor to transfer to the 
Marital Trust A that share of the probate estate which will permit 
taking full advantage of the marital deduction without any unneces-
sary overfunding of the surviving spouse's estate. Since the maxi-
mum marital deduction is 560,000 dollars, and bearing in mind that 
the value of non-probate assets qualifying for the marital deduction 
aggregates 150,000 dollars,108 it is apparent that an additional 410,000 
dollars is to be qualified by the formula clause.109 
legislation recognizes and deals with the problems. Section 17-e of the Personal Prop• 
erty Law (Chapter 165 of the Laws of 1964, effective June 1, 1965) provides, in § 17-e(l), 
statutory recognition of the requirement for reimbursement if estate taxes are increased 
by the election to take deductions as income tax deductions rather than for estate tax 
purposes unless the wiII provides that such adjustment is not to be required. Sub-
division 2(a) of § 17-e(I) provides that no adjustment is required where the marital 
share has been increased by the election (with the resultant effect on the "adjusted gross 
estate" and the available marital deduction) unless the will provides otherwise. 
Similarly subdivision 2(b) provides, absent a contrary will provision, that no adjustment 
is required as a result of election of the alternative valuation date. For a detailed 
discussion, see Lewis, Tax Elections by Executors and Administrators, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 498, 
501-04 (1964) discussing potential problems arising from the interplay of § 17-e and 
of Decedent Estate Law § 18. 
108. This ignores the possibility that a widow's support allowance will be granted 
and will qualify for the marital deduction. Since the decision in Jackson v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964), it is doubtful that many such widow's awards will qualify. 
The Jackson case and qualification of widow's awards is the subject of a comprehensive 
note. See 63 MICH. L. REv. 924 (1965). Even in a state such as Ohio, where the award 
is deemed vested if the widow survives the decedent, provisions may be found per• 
mitting review and curtailment of the award, thus casting doubt upon the qualification 
of any significant amount. In a state like Illinois, which holds the award vested and 
specifies a minimum award of $1,000 even though the surviving spouse lives only a 
few hours longer than the decedent, this amount should qualify but will not seriously 
affect the computations; neither does it permit effective post-death planning to 
salvage the results of failure to qualify sufficient property. In such case, the major 
effort to qualify property for the marital deduction is through the device of having 
the surviving spouse claim against the will, taking a statutory share. See, e.g., Isaac 
Harter, Jr., 39 T.C. 511 (1962); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 73 
(S.D. Ind. 1961). In certain cases, the receipt of the commuted cash value of the 
widow's elected dower right will qualify. See, e.g., First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. United 
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The attorney now faces two quite different drafting problems. 
The first is an exercise in semantics; he must decide how he may 
most clearly express the fraction.110 The second involves a decision 
with greater substantive effect; he must specify the pool of assets 
on which the fraction is to operate. This decision may have an 
effect on the quantum of assets the marital share will ultimately 
receive. Further, in the view of one commentator, it may affect the 
actual makeup of the assets distributed.111 -
It is helpful to note that the fraction prescribed serves two quite 
different purposes. First, it describes the proportionate share of the 
residuary estate that is to be qualified for the marital deduction. 
Necessarily this will produce an amount, expressed in dollars, to 
be claimed on the estate tax return. Second, once constituted, the 
fraction will be applied to actually allocate the aliquot shares of 
the described residuary estate to the marital and nonmarital trusts 
at the distribution date. Since the actual value of assets comprising 
the residue will change during administration,112 the distribution 
date value of the marital share will rarely be the same as the amount 
claimed for the marital deduction. But the fraction itself will change 
States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1964); Wachovia Bank &: Trust Co. v. United States, 234 F. 
Supp. 897 (M.D.N.C. 1964). These avenues are, however, poor substitutes for proper 
planning. For example, in Michigan, upon election to take against the will, the 
surviving spouse is entitled to the share of personal property receivable in case of 
intestacy until the amount reaches $5,000, but her statutory share includes only one-
half of the amount of the residue of the personalty to which she would be entitled 
in case of intestacy. (The elected statutory share in real estate is the same in the case 
of intestacy.) MICH. COMP. LAws § 702.69 (Supp. 1961). Thus, if the husband left his 
wife a life estate in the entire estate (all of which was personalty), an election to take 
against the will would give her only about one-sixth (assuming there were children 
of the decedent), and she might be quite reluctant to reduce estate taxes at such a 
sacrifice of her rights. 
109. The testator might first (and, hopefully, not last) consider a simple clause 
describing the marital share as "one-half of my adjusted gross estate." This will not 
accomplish his purpose if he seeks to avoid overqualification. One-half of the adjusted 
gross estate will produce a share of the estate with an estate tax value of $560,000 
($150,000 more than necessary). In King v. Citizens &: So. Nat'l Bank, 103 So. 2d 
689 (Fla. 1958), the will provided a bequest to the widow of "50 percent of my adjusted 
gross estate." The bequest to the widow was deemed to be unambiguous; the amount 
under the will was not reduced by non-probate assets passing to the widow and other-
wise qualified for the marital deduction! The problem is discussed in Berger &: Kanter, 
Shop Talk, 15 J. TAXATION 382, 383 (1961). A second problem which is not considered 
for present purposes, but which should always be considered by the professional 
adviser, is whether it would be advisable to pass more (or less) than the precise amount 
needed to qualify for the maximum marital deduction. For discussion of this point, see 
Polasky, supra note 104, at 32. 
ll0. Compare Golden, supra note 73, with Durbin, supra note 94. 
lll. Casner, supra note 101. 
112. Not only will the values of particular assets vary, but, when the executor 
exercises his power to sell, invest, and reinvest, the composition of the residue also 
will vary. 
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only with non-pro-rata interim distributions or additions to the 
described asset pool.113 
One illustrative clause provides, "Trust A shall be comprised of 
the fractional share of all property passing under this Article [the 
residuary estate] (exclusive of property or interests in property, if 
any, which would not qualify for the estate tax marital deduction 
under the Internal Revenue Code if left outright to my wife) re-
quired to obtain for my estate a full marital deduction of fifty per 
cent of the adjusted gross estate as finally determined for federal 
estate tax purposes, taking into account the aggregate marital deduc-
tions allowable other than under the provisions of this Article. Said 
share shall not be diminished by any portion of the taxes payable by 
reason of the death taxes payable by reason of my death."114 
The above clause makes it reasonably clear115 that the numerator 
of the fraction, applied to whatever residue is designated (the latter 
being valued as for federal estate tax purposes),116 will be 410,000 
dollars. (The maximum marital deduction was 560,000 dollars and 
150,000 dollars otherwise qualified.) Further, to avoid the "tainted 
asset" problem, it specifically excludes from the defined pool any 
asset which would not qualify.117 (Some scriveners prefer to exclude 
these assets from the pool by an antecedent paragraph specifically 
directing such assets to Trust B, the residuary trust.)118 
113. For the view of a service official that interim distributions require recalcula-
tion of the fraction, see Sheets, Fm. EsT. &: GIFr TAX REP. ,I 8147, at 7241 (1964). 
ll4. Report of Subcommittee on Forms for Marital Deduction Planning, 103 
TRUSTS&: ESTATES 961, 965 (1964). 
115. See Golden, supra note 73; Durbin, supra note 94. 
ll6. Occasionally, a clause is encountered which defines the denominator as the 
residuary probate. estate valued at fair market value as of the distribution date. This 
"sliding fraction" clause would appear to be simply a bequest of a pecuniary amount; 
it merely provides for distribution of assets with a distribution date value of $410,000 
from the residue. 
117. As noted earlier, absent specification to the contrary the fraction would allocate 
a fraction of all assets comprising the residue, including -those which would not 
qualify for the marital deduction, thus additional property would be passed to the 
widow's share without any increased benefit. The problem with a true fractional share 
is, however, confined to overfunding. In cases where a pecuniary clause is used and the 
dispositive instrument fails to specify that only property qualifying for the marital 
deduction is to be used, the available deduction is reduced by the non-qualifying assets 
which could be used to satisfy the bequest. I.R.C., § 2056(b)(2); Rev. Reg. §§ 20.2056 
(b)-l(c)(2)(ii), 20.2056(b)-2; John P. Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384 (1957). See also Craven, supra 
note 94, at 625; Polasky, supra note 104, at 25. 
118. E.g., Bolte, supra note 94, at 541, suggests "also a mandatory power to exclude 
from the marital share those assets appearing in the gross estate which would not 
qualify for the marital deduction if so included, might cause a new complication, 
however. The problem is this-if the executor should allocate one asset to the marital 
share, and another asset having an equal value at that time, but a different basis to the 
estate, to the non-marital share, perhaps it will be considered a taxable exchange." 
See also Peeler, Unsuspected Realization of Profit in Estates and Trusts, 98 TRUSTS 8: 
ESTATES 1191, ll92 (1959). See Sheets, Practical Solutions to 64-19, 104 TRUSTS 8: ESTATES 
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Since both the numerator (the desired marital deduction share) 
and the denominator (the pool from which it is to be drawn) must 
be valued at federal estate tax values, many counselors prefer to 
spell out the fractional share in terms of a numerator and de-
nominator as indicated in the footnote.119 
Once the pool (the denominator) is adequately described, the 
results should be the same no matter which form of expression is 
used. But does the dispositive clause adequately spell out the pool 
· against which the fraction is to be described? If the general pecuniary 
legacy, debts, claims, and tax.es were all to be paid from the residue 
after constitution of the fraction (a possible, though admittedly 
atypical, direction),120 the fraction would be 410,000 dollars (the 
marital gift at federal estate tax values) over 1,000,000 dollars (the 
residuary probate estate, at federal estate tax values, to which the 
fraction is to be applied). Actually, the form quoted above provides 
for the general pecuniary legacy and payment of debts, claims, and 
expenses in antecedent paragraphs, while directing that death tax.es 
be paid from the nonmarital (Trust B) portion of the residuary 
estate. As thus defined, the fraction has a numerator of 410,000 
dollars and a denominator equal to 870,000 dollars (the 1,000,000 
dollar probate estate less the 50,000 dollar general pecuniary legacy 
and the 80,000 dollars of debts, claims, and administrative expenses). 
Applied to the defined residuary estate of 870,000 dollars, the frac-
tion of 410/870 again produces a marital gift of a fractional share 
of the residue with a federal estate tax value of 410,000 dollars. 
If, as some have suggested, the residue is to be defined as an 
"after-tax residue,"121 the fraction becomes 4100/7243 (the probate 
estate having been reduced to 724,300 dollars for purposes of defin-
ing the residue by deduction of 275,700 dollars, comprised of 50,000 
dollars for the legacy, 80,000 dollars for debts, claims, and adminis-
trative expenses, and 145,700 dollars for federal and state succession 
71, 72 (1965), for the views of a senior official of the Internal Revenue Service. If the 
executor is given a specific direction to use only qualifying assets in constituting the 
fractional share, this suggestion does not seem to present a realistic danger. Neverthe-
less, it does seem preferable, simply as a matter of drafting, to allocate the non-
qualifying assets to the non-qualifying trust before constituting the residue or pool on 
which the fraction will operate. 
119. Durbin, supra note 94; see form at note 162 infra. 
120. For an illustration, see Casner, supra note 101, at 191. 
121. E.g., see Golden, supra note 73, at 538 n.11: "The fractional share formula 
suggested by the Harris Bank for use by attorneys directs payment of taxes as 
administration expenses and divides the remaining residuary estate • . • ." See also 
Report of Subcommittee on Forms for Marital Deduction Planning, supra note 114, at 
965: "I give • . • the residue of my estate remaining after payment of all death 
taxes •..• " 
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taxes). Again, the fraction (4100/7243) applied to the defined residue 
(724,300 dollars) produces a marital gift of 410,000 dollars. 
C. Operational Problems 
Although in each case the fraction qualifies an additional 
410,000 dollars for the marital deduction, it will be recalled that 
the fraction serves a second purpose. At date of distribution, it is 
applied to the defined residue and directs the allocation of the 
prescribed fractional share of the pool to the marital trust. If 
nothing has changed, the distribution date value of the designated 
fractional share will be the same as the marital deduction it was 
designed to obtain. But values do change during administration, 
and it is at this juncture that differences in the value of the marital 
share arise from the varying alternative methods of describing the 
residue. 
In the example posited, the value of probate assets had increased 
from 1,000,000 dollars to 1,200,000 dollars at the date one year 
later when all payments and distributions are made. If the residue 
against which the fraction is to be applied is the entire probate 
estate before payment of any obligations, the fraction 41/100 pro-
duces a forty-one per cent interest for the marital share. Assuming 
that the fraction is to be applied to the available assets and a frac-
tional share of each is to be distributed to the marital share,122 no 
revaluation is necessary; the fractional interest in each asset is 
distributed. But for purposes of illustration it can be seen that 
forty-one per cent of 1,200,000 dollars produces an aggregate value 
of 492,000 dollars.123 Had the fraction been constituted after pay-
ment of the legacy, debts, claims, and administration expenses, the 
fraction would be 41/87 of the assets remaining after appropriation 
of assets for those purposes (1,200,000 dollars less 130,000 dollars 
equals 1,070,000 dollars) and a distribution date value of 504,250 
dollars would result. Similarly, the "after-tax" clause would pro-
duce a fraction of 4100/7243 or 56.6064 per cent and, applied to 
the "true residue" after all other distributions, would produce a 
fractional share of the remaining available assets equal in value to 
523,312.80 dollars. 
Several observations are possible at this point. Shrinking the 
122. The clause should clearly indicate that the executor is to distribute the marital 
share in kind; otherwise, a distribution in cash equal to the fractional share may be 
decreed. See In re Umpleby's Will, 252 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1964). 
123. If the residue was defined to exclude only the $50,000 legacy, the fraction 
would be 41/95 (43.16%), producing $496,320. 
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residue to which the fraction is to be applied obviously increases 
the percentage interest of the marital share in the remaining avail-
able assets, since the numerator stays the same while the denomina-
tor diminishes.124 Further, shrinking the defined residue gives the 
executor an increasing power to choose assets to satisfy the general 
pecuniary legacy and other non-residue obligations and a con-
comitant power to affect the makeup, in terms of the specific assets 
remaining, of the pool to which the fractional share will be ap-
plied, though obviously the aggregate distribution date value of 
the quantum distributed will be frozen by the particular fraction 
described. 
We have been assuming that, once determined, the fraction is 
simply applied to whatever assets comprise the defined residue at 
the distribution date. Discussions with trust administrators in vari-
ous sections of the country indicate that in many cases this accords 
with actual practice. But the argument might be made that the 
ascertained fraction is to be applied to each asset of the defined 
residue as initially constituted, rather than to those items com-
prising the residue at the date of distribution. One writer has 
suggested this,1211 while another has expressed the view that courts 
are likely to, and should, apply the fraction to the assets available 
at date of distribution.126 Mercifully, perhaps, most commentators 
have not mentioned the issue when discussing fractional share 
clauses. 
The difficulty of the tracing problem involved, even in our 
simple case, is obviously increased when the basic values (upon 
which both numerator and denominator are based) as finally deter-
mined for federal estate tax purposes may not be ascertained for a 
good many months, if not years. Ignoring that problem for the 
moment, the possible application of the formula to the residue, as 
initially constituted, might produce the following results. 
I. The Effect of Different Methods of Constituting the 
Fractional Share127 
(1) Assume the fractional share is to be constituted after pay-
ment of the pecuniary legacy but before debts, taxes, and 
124. As a result, the marital share will receive an increasing proportion of any 
appreciation or depreciation of residuary asset values during administration. 
125. Casner, supra note IOI. 
126. Covey, supra note 92. · 
127. See Casner, mpra note 101, for a somewhat similar set of examples. 
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expenses (41/95 = 43.16 per cent). Debts, taxes, and ex-
penses are to be paid from the nonmarital share.128 
(a) The executor sells 1,500 shares of C and 1,000 shares 
of B (raising 100,000 dollars + 100,000 dollars). He 
pays the 50,000 dollar legacy and 225,700 dollars of 
debts, administrative expenses, and taxes. He receives 
a stock dividend of ten per cent on the remaining B 
shares (2,000). He sells 500 shares of A stock and 
purchases 10,000 shares of D stock with the proceeds. 
(b) At the time of distribution the executor holds: 
2,500 shares of A129 
10,000 shares of D129 
2,200 shares of B129 
1,500 shares of C 
Cash (original cash after legacy of $50,000 
was $50,000; payments for taxes from 








(c) The marital share of each is determined according to 
the percentage of the original assets: 
Cash: 43.16% (of $50,000) 
A shares 43.16% of 2,500 
D shares 43.16% of 10,000 
B shares (43.16% of original 
3,000 shares) 















128. While normally the residue will be constituted after payment of legacies, 
debts, and expenses, this example is used to emphasize the differing results which 
could occur. 
129. The remaining 2,500 shares of A stock and the 10,000 shares of D stock together 
represent the original 3,000 of A stock. This example assumes that the aggregate value 
of the B stock was unaffected by the 10% stock dividend. 
130. The marital share should have been allocated 1,294.80 shares of the B stock 
(this being 43.16% of 3,000 shares). The 10% stock dividend on ,those shares added 
129.48 shares of B stock to the marital share, making a total of 1,424.28 shares. 
131. Note: (1) The shares sold to pay taxes were taken from the nonmarital 
share; other shares sold to purchase new stock were drawn pro-rata from the marital 
and nonmarital share; (2) The net gain of $200,000 has inured ratably to the marital 
share (43.16% of $200,000 = $86,320). 
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(2) Assume the fractional share is to be constituted after pay-
ment of legacies, administration expenses, debts, and taxes 
(4100/7243 = 56.6064 per cent). (Note the modification of 
the tracing problem.) 
(a) The executor sells 1,500 shares of C and 1,000 shares 
of B (raising 100,000 dollars + 100,000 dollars). He 
pays out 275,700 dollars (legacy, debts, expenses, and 
taxes). He receives a stock dividend of ten per cent 
on the remaining B shares. He sells 500 shares of A 
stock and purchases 10,000 shares of D stock with 
the proceeds. 
(b) At the time of distribution the executor holds 
the same assets as under (1) (b ). 
(c) The marital share is 56.6064 per cent of each asset 
held at date of distribution (total value equals 523,-
212.96 dollars), since the fraction is applied to the 
"true residue" after payment of all other obligations 
(and no non-pro-rata distributions have been made): 
Cash (56.6064% of $24,300) $ 13,755.36 
A and D shares ($600,000) 339,638.40 
B shares ($200,000) 113,212.80 
C shares ($100,000) 56,606.40 
$523,212.96132 
(3) Same facts as in (2), except that the only stock transaction is 
a sale of 1,000 shares of A (for 200,000 dollars). • The marital 
share, equal to 56.6064 per cent: 
Residue Value of Marital Share 
Cash $ 13,755.36 
A ($400,000) 226,425.60 
B ($300,000) 169,819.20 
C ($200,000) 113,212.80 
$523,212.96 
Countless additional variations might be suggested. 
Proof: Prior Marital Share 
Add: "Appreciation" 
(43.16% of $200,000) 
Proof: $1,150,000 X 4!1.16 (-) = 
132. Proof: Original Marital Share 
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It may not be inappropriate to depart for a moment from the 
simple, clinically sterile hypothetical posed in order to briefly sketch 
a few of the other problems which may arise during administration. 
a. Income Earned on "Expended Assets" (Assets Used To Pay 
Funeral and Administration Expenses, Taxes, Debts, 
and General Legacies )138 
(1) Allocation Between the Marital Share and the Residue 
First, it will be recalled that forty thousand dollars was earned 
by the probate estate during the first year of administration. To 
what extent should this be allocated to the marital and non-
marital income beneficiaries? In the posited case, the answer is 
"relatively" easy since the widow is entitled to the entire income 
from both shares. We are assuming that no part of the income is to 
be distributed to the legatee under the general pecuniary legacy.134 
Had the widow been entitled to income from the marital share 
only and, to stabilize a few variables for analytical purposes, assum-
ing that the residue was comprised of all 1,000,000 dollars, the 
widow would appear to be entitled to at least forty-one per cent 
(16,400 dollars). But is she entitled to more? 
It might be suggested that income earned during the first year 
of administration was derived as follows: 
Marital Share 
Residuary Trust 
Assets Used To Satisfy Legacy, 
Administration Expenses, Debts, 
and Taxes 
Total 
$410,000 at 4% = $16,400 
314,300 at 4% = 12,572 
275,700 at 4% = 11,028 
$1,000,000 $40,000 
A problem thus arises as to appropriate allocation of the 11,028 
dollars earned on funds used to pay the legacy, administration ex-
penses, debts, and taxes. Three of the possible choices are: 
Applicable Widow's 
Choice Fraction Share 
(a) Ratio of Marital 410,000 Share to "After- X $11,028 $6,242.55 
Tax" Residue 724,300 
133. Report of Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, supra note 87. 
134. See id. at 916; 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 234.3 (2d ed. 1956). 
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(b) Ratio of Marital 410,000 Share to Probate X $11,028 $4,521.48 
Estate 1,000,000 
(c) All to Residuary to 




Choice of one or another of these alternatives might be based 
upon the following theories: 
(a) Those entitled to income share ratably. Thus the marital 
share (widow) should receive 4100/7243 (or 6,242.56 dol-
lars) and the nonmarital trust 3143/7243 of the income. 
(b) The marital share (widow) is entitled to that portion of 
income earned during administration on amounts used to 
pay debts, taxes, and the like in proportion to her share 
of the gross probate estate. Thus here she would receive 
forty-one per cent of the 11,028 dollars, or 4,521.48 dollars. 
(c) The marital share is simply entitled to forty-one per cent 
of the estate before any payments, and, therefore, to forty-
one per cent of the total income (40,000 dollars) received 
during administration. 
Obviously, other alternatives are possible. Indeed, a more prob-
able choice is indicated by a recent study which suggests, "Assume 
an estate, after administration expenses and debts of $1,000,000 be-
queathed one-half outright to the widow and one-half outright to 
other individuals [ and] that estate taxes are paid, charged solely 
against the half of the estate bequeathed to the other individuals. 
Of the $750,000 remaining in the possession of the executor, the 
widow is still entitled to $500,000, which is now two-thirds of the 
undistributed assets .... Before the estate taxes are paid, the estate 
will yield $40,000 annually which will be distributed $20,000 to the 
widow and $20,000 to other beneficiaries."135 
A strict application of the analogy to our hypothesized 
case would suggest that the widow was entitled to 410/870 of 40,000 
dollars or approximately 18,850 dollars (thus sharing in the income 
produced by amounts used to satisfy all obligations except taxes). 
The report cites no authority, and an informal survey of corporate 
fiduciaries suggests varying approaches not necessarily keyed to the 
particular definition of the residue. Some apply the fraction pro-
duced by the formula while others allocate to the marital share only 
135. Report of Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, supra note 87, at 
922. (Emphasis added.) 
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that amount of income which the average rate of return would pro-
duce on the calculated marital share. 
(2) Allocation Between Income and Principal for Trust 
Accounting Purposes 
If it be assumed, for the moment, that the executor will allocate 
all income earned on expended assets to the nonmarital Trust B 
(a particularly appropriate result where the denominator is com-
prised of the entire probate estate and taxes are to be paid from 
Trust B136), a further problem arises. Shall the 11,028 dollars be 
treated for trust accounting purposes as income or principal or as 
some combination thereof? Again, there are at least three choices, 
and a lack of unanimity among the various jurisdictions is shown 
by a recent study.137 
Under the so-called "Massachusetts rule,"138 the entire distribu-
tion would be treated as income and distributed to the income 
beneficiaries of Trust B. This is the position now adopted by the 
Revised Principal and Income Act139 and the Restatement of Trusts, 
Second.140 The trend is distinctly in this direction.141 Several other 
approaches have been taken at various times, however. The "Old 
136. If the fractional share is applied to the true residue (4100/7243 of $724,300), 
and income allocated proportionately, the marital trust receives $22,642.56 (56.6064% of 
$40,000). (This is $16,400 representing income on $410,000 plus 56.6064% of the 
$ll,028, since the expended assets have been excluded from the residue and residuary 
legatees share ratably in income accruing to the residue.) See id. at 917. 3 Scon, op. cit. 
supra note 134, § 234.3. If the "English rule" (see text accompanying note 144 infra) 
is applicable, however, ,the fraction is applied only to $29,396 ($10,704 being allocable 
to corpus of the residue) and -the fraction itself becomes 410,000/735,044. See 
text accompanying note 145 infra. Suffice it to say, this potential result may be 
appropriately avoided by specifying (1) allocation of income in the same proportion 
as the defined fractional share of the residue and (2) providing that income from 
"expended assets" is to be treated as income of the trusts created from the residue. 
137. Report of Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, supra note 87, at 
917. The problem is discussed in 3 Scon, op. cit. supra note 134, at § 234.4; Lauritzen, 
Estate Income During Administration, Tax Counselor's Q., Dec. 1959, p. 1. 
138. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929). 
139. Section 5(c). For a detailed analysis of the Revised Principal and Income Act 
which was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962 (HANDBOOK 
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 249 (1962)) 
and by the American Bar Association in 1963 (Proceedings of the 1963 Midyear Meeting 
of the House of Delegates, 49 A.B.A.J. 385, 393 (1963)), see Note, The Revised Uniform 
Principal and Income Act, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473, 479 (emphasizing the historical devel-
opment of the Illinois rule). 
140. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 234, comment g (1959). 
141. E.g., New York switched from the "Old New York" rule to the Massachusetts 
rule in 1931. Laws of 1931, ch. 706 (now N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 17(b). In 1949, 
Maryland abandoned the rule enunciated in Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 
SU (1952), and adopted the Massachusetts rule with respect to estates of persons dying 
after enactment of the statute. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 93, § 391 (1964). The shift in the 
Restatement position, supra note 140, is symptomatic of the trend toward the simpler 
Massachusetts position. 
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New York" rule (no longer applied in New York, which has shifted 
to the Massachusetts rule142) would allocate the entire amount to 
principal.143 A third possibility, and an appalling one for non-
mathematically inclined counselors, is the so-called English Rule144 
under which the income would be calculated as follows: 
Amount Needed To Pay Debts, etc. $275,700 
Divided by Principal Plus Interest, 
Using a 4% Discount Rate + 104% 
Amount of Principal Needed To Pay 
Legacy, Expenses, Debts, Taxes $265,096 
Balance to Principal (4% of $265,096) 10,604~ 
Income on $10,604 (and distributable $ll,028 
as income) 424 
The theory of the "English Rule," as illustrated, is that obliga-
tions are considered as having been paid from principal in an 
amount which, with the income thereon at the rate of return re-
ceived on the whole estate from the death of the testator to the 
dates of payment, would equal the amounts paid. 
To take but one illustration, if the English rule should be 
deemed applicable and were actually applied by the executor, it 
would appear that an "after-tax" formula would be constituted a 
bit differently from any previously considered. In this situation, the 
net amount of original principal utilized to pay taxes, legacies, 
debts, and the like was 265,096 dollars (rather than 275,700 dollars). 
The numerator would remain the same, but both the denominator 
and the residuary estate as defined would be 734,904 dollars (re-
flecting the net principal used in the amount of 265,096 dollars, or, 
phrased differently, reflecting the addition of 10,604 dollars to the 
corpus of the defined residue). If asset values had not changed, the 
application of the formula to the defined residue would seem to be: 
410,000 X 734 9041411 
734,904 ' 
Asset values do, however, change, and the formula fraction 
would actually be applied to the defined residue at distribution 
date which would have a value of 934,904 dollars (the 924,300 dollars 
shown in the previous examples plus the 10,604 dollars allocated 
to corpus under the English rule). 
The attorney need not be appalled; the solution lies in appro-
142. See note 141 supra. 
143. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Frazer, 199 Md. 620, 87 A.2d 811 (1952); Proctor v. 
American Security &: Trust Co., 98 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
144. See Allhusen v. Whitten, [1867] 4 Eq. 295; In re McEuen, [1913] 2 Ch. 704; 
3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 134, § 234.4. 
145. See note 136 supra. 
• 
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priate draftsmanship. If he is convinced that the "Old New York" 
and English views add an unwarranted complexity to an already 
troubled area, it would seem prudent to provide in the will that 
income received from "expended assets" should (I) be deemed in-
come and (2) distributed to the income beneficiaries.146 In such 
cases, he need not be concerned with the rule the testator's juris-
diction follows. 
b. Payment of Legacies, Debts, Expenses, and Taxes 
Prior to Complete Distribution 
A number of additional administrative problems may be posed. 
For example, payment of some or all of the legacy, debts, adminis-
tration expenses, and taxes might occur prior to complete distribu-
tion of the respective shares. 
Under an "after-tax" clause, the administrator will probably 
continue to apply the "ascertained" fraction in determining income 
distributions. Yet occasions for partial non-pro-rata distributions 
are not unknown. If this occurs, theoretically the fraction applicable 
to income distributions should be altered, creating substantial 
burdens in terms of estate accounting. These burdens may well 
account for the reluctance of corporate fiduciaries to make non-
pro-rata partial distributions during administration.147 The prob-
lem is starkly illustrated when the fraction is constituted before the 
payment of taxes, the latter being made a charge on the nonmarital 
share of the residue and paid during administration.148 
146. Ibid. 
147. Another problem tending toward this same reluctance, however, is created by 
income tax treatment of partial distributions as "distributable net income" under 
I.R.C., § 663(a)(I). This problem is considered in the next section of this article. 
148. See generally Report of Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, 102 
TRUSTS &: ESTATES 916, 922 (1963), setting forth the four principal methods of alloca-
tion of income: (I) the gross share method "under which the income is distributed 
among the residuary legatees in the shares fixed by the will; i.e., in the proportions 
in which they are entitled to share in principal before taxes have been paid. The 
unequal apportionment of taxes is ignored and the income distribution ratio remains 
constant throughout the administration ... ; [(2) the] 'net share' method, in which 
income is allocateU on the basis of the net distributable shares, either as determined 
on the final accounting or as projected from the date of death on the basis of estimated 
expenses and taxes •.. ; [(3)] a third method ... in which the allocation ratio is 
adjusted as taxes are paid •.. " ibid.; and (4) a method making pro-rata distributions 
to the marital share, as taxes and other distributions are made from the nonmarital 
share, to maintain the identical fractional ratio between the marital and nonmarital 
trusts. The administrative and "Subchapter J" income tax problems of the latter 
method are apparent. The first method has been characterized as easiest to administer 
-and least fair in operation. Apparently, difficulty of administration increases pro-
portionately with equity of result! The Committee's comment on this wonderland is 
informative, ""\Ve have not referred to any of the four methods mentioned as the 
general or favored rule. Reports from members of the Committee indicate that the 
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c. Administrative Powers 
Separate articles could be, and have been, written about the 
effect of various administrative powers, either (1) granted the execu-
tor by the dispositive instrument, or (2) thrust upon him by the 
Internal Revenue Code.149 Illustrative of the former is the power 
sometimes given the executor to value assets at distribution.ll;o 
Where used to allocate specific assets in satisfaction of the value 
which would be produced by the actual allocation of a fractional 
share of each asset, a contention might be made that this power in 
the executor permits a variance of the marital share, with potential 
disqualification. Of course, the argument should fail where it is 
clear that the executor is bound by the normal fiduciary principle 
of impartiality. Nevertheless, a problem of this type has arisen in 
the Boston area. 
The second type of problem (powers thrust upon the fiduciary 
by the Code itself) might be illustrated by the executor's choice 
between valuing assets as of date of death or at the permitted 
alternative valuation date.151 Similarly, the Code permits the execu-
gross share rule is used most frequently, as might be expected from its relative ease of 
administration. Because there is little case or statute law establishing one or the other 
of the available methods as a standard, however, allocations are usually governed by 
local practice, about which it is difficult to generalize. Often, -the method of allocation 
used in a particular estate is selected by the executor or his attorney solely on the 
basis of what they consider to be just and equitable on the facts of that matter,:_•One of 
the other methods might be selected in another estate, if the circumstances should 
warrant. The probate courts appear generally disposed to accept whatever allocation 
is presented if it is not obviously outrageous and there are no objections." Id. at 924. 
149. See, e.g., Casner, A Fiduciary's Powers and the Marital Deduction, 100 TRUSTS 
&: EsrATES 247 (1961); Dane, Marital Deduction Questions, 103 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 112 
(1964); Rodman, Executor's Power To Allocate Property To Qualify for the Marital 
Deduction, 94 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 801 (1955). 
150. Under the "Boston powers" clause, the executor is given the power to value 
assets as of the date of distribution when a second valuation is necessary, as in the 
case of a distribution of selected assets equal in value to that quantum produced by 
applying the fraction to the "pool" or defined residue at distribution date. Boston 
fiduciaries have suggested that this avoids a second appraisal where assets, such as 
closely-held corporate stock, may be involved and that the fiduciary is limited by 
normal trust principles of impartiality. In the Chicago area, fiduciaries discourage the 
use of such a clause, reasoning that the fiduciary already possesses such a power and 
specific reference to it can serve only as a "red flag." 
151. For example, in the hypothetit'al. case, use of the alternative valuation date 
would produce an adjusted gross estate of $1,320,000 and an additional quantum to be 
qualified of $510,000 ($660,000 maximum marital deduction minus $150,000 of assets 
otherwise qualified). Both the gross estate and the federal estate tax would be altered, 
with correlative changes in the constitution of the fraction (or amount, under a 
pecuniary formula). Even in a rising market, however, basis considerations combined 
with the additional marital deduction might tip the scales in favor of the alternative 
date despite the higher federal estate taxes. See Casner, supra note 149, at 249. While 
it is not believed that the choice of alternative date should in any way affect the 
allowability of the maximum marital deduction based on such choice, questions have 
been raised by representatives of the Internal Revenue Service. See Reiling, Revenue 
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tor to take administration expenses either as a deduction for estate 
income tax purposes152 or as an estate tax deduction.1«s3 This again 
affects the determination of the adjusted gross estate1«s4 and, con-
Procedure 64-19-Rethinking Marital Deduction Clauses, 103 TRUSTS 8e ESTATES 905, 
906 (1964); cf. Revenue Procedure 64-19-Panel Discussion, 103 TRUSTS 8e ESTATES 917, 
919-20 (1964). 
152. I.R.C., § 642. 
153. I.R.C., § 2053. 
154. See note 107 supra. A simplified illustration: 
Gross Estate 
Less: § 2053 Ded'ns 
Adj. Gross Est. 
Gift to surviving 
spouse equal to 
maximum marital 
deduction 
Taxable Estate (after 
Exemption of $60,000) 
Estate Tax• 
(a) 
















Deduction Taken for Estate 
Tax Purposes per 

















Difference (Decrease in Residue) 





Increase in '\\life's 
"Share" under (a) 
Income Tax on Income 
Gross Income of Estate 
Less: Administration 
Expenses 
Income from Estate 
Tax••• 
Benefit to Wife from: 
Election (a) Increased 
share of Residue 
Reduction of Income 

















59,860 .. •• 
34,860 
Notes: • Assume state succession taxes equal to maximum credit allowable. 
•• Assume state succession taxes equal to maximum credit allowed for 
federal estate tax and that all taxes are paid from the residue. 
••• Computed for illustrative purposes without consideration of other 
deductions and exemptions, and using 1963 rates. 
•••• Less the actuarial value of the income from $17,000 for life (income 
from $25,000 for life minus the income from $8,000 for life). The 
wife was already entitled to the income from the entire estate. She 
therefore is benefitted to the extent of present value of the remainder 
in the additional bequest of $25,000, but this "gain" is cut down by 
the loss of income from the additional $8,000 paid from the residue 
to fund the additional tax. 
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sequently, the fraction used to determine the marital share. These 
clearly should not affect qualification of the determined share for 
the marital deduction, though the election will affect the quantum 
of the interest passing and the amount of the deduction allowable. 
Again, these problems are explored in detail elsewhere.1511 
A recently suggested ploy is the inclusion of a "bootstrap" clause, 
specifying that the fiduciary is not granted any power which would 
result in disallowance of all or a part of the marital deduction. 
Appealing though it is, it leaves the fiduciary in the unenviable posi-
tion of complete uncertainty as to the extent of his powers, absent 
litigation which he would prefer to avoidl156 
(3) Fractional Share of Each Item'! 
To this point, it has been assumed that, under a fractional share 
clause, distribution will be made of a fractional share of each item 
of the residue. While one writer suggests that this "is feasible in 
the majority of estates and limits the significance of this question to 
unusual fact situations,''157 it will be demonstrated later in this 
article that such distribution may create cumbersome dispositions 
and post-administrative problems. This raises the question of 
whether the executor might distribute selected assets having a 
distribution date value equal to the aggregate value of the marital 
share's aliquot fraction of each item of the residue. Would he have 
the authority (and "nerve") to do so absent a specific grant of 
authority? And would the grant of such authority to the executor 
create possibilities of gain upon distribution of appreciated assets? 
Further, if it appears that the marital share is entitled to demand 
an aliquot share of each item in the residue, what tax effects would 
flow from an agreement by the executor and all beneficiaries to an 
appropriate agreed allocation of selected items to the marital and 
nonmarital shares? It is to these income tax questions, and others, 
that attention is turned as a final bit of background before con-
sidering in summary the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
the various types of formula clauses. But, before we turn to these 
questions, it should be noted that the foregoing analysis suggests 
155. See Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, Tax Coun-
selor's Q., June 1959, pp. 1, 6. 
156. See Dane, supra note 149, at 113. An example of a "bootstrap" clause that has 
recently been proposed reads: "Any provision in this instrument shall be ineffective to 
the extent the existence of such provision would result in the estate of the donor 
failing to be entitled to the maximum such marital deduction." 
157. Bolte, Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 532, 
543 (1961). 
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that the fractional share formula clause, at both the drafting and 
operational stages, is not without problems! 
IV. INCOME TAX AsPECTS 
At this juncture, an analysis of the income tax problems associ-
ated with various types of marital gifts designed to qualify for the 
marital deduction158 hopefully should serve several purposes. First, 
it should emphasize and sharply delineate the quite separate nature 
of the income tax aspects of such bequests from the question of 
qualification for the federal estate tax marital deduction. Second, 
while tending to clarify the approaches and underlying reasons in-
herent in the income tax treatment of distributions, it should furnish 
some additional framework for discussing the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of the several types of formula clauses. 
While keeping in mind that this facet of the discussion deals 
only with income tax aspects, it becomes necessary to recognize that 
here, too, we deal with a hierarchy of distinct questions. First, the 
consequences to the estate of a distribution must be differentiated 
from the tax results to the distributee. Second, tax questions ap• 
plicable to both the estate and distributee involve: (a) Is there a 
realization of income (gain) or loss; (b) If so, how much; (c) Is such 
income or loss recognized; and (d) Is any gain or loss treated as a 
capital gain or loss and, if so, what was the holding period. 
A. Illustrative Types of Dispositive Directions159 
It is sometimes helpful to work from well-defined polar ap-
proaches and, with these as points of departure, to direct consider-
ation to the spectrum of cases which fall between the extremes. 
Reverting to the first basic example of an estate in which the 
maximum marital deduction was 500,000 dollars, one might en-
counter a direction to provide a qualifying sum for the widow 
(whether ascertained by formula or not) couched in any of the 
following forms: 
158. These problems are considered in depth elsewhere. See, e.g., 1 CASNER, EsTATE 
PLANNING 84, 816 (3d ed. 1961); Roberts & Muller, Constructive Receipt of Income by 
Estates and Trusts Through Distributions in Kind to Beneficiaries, 4 TAX L. REv. 
372 (1949). See also Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction Formula Clauses Under 
New Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAXATION 352 (1964); Stevens, Fourteen Years of Marital 
Deduction, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 257, 272 (1963). 
159. Illustrative dispositive clauses of various types are set out in Casner, How To 
Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 190 (1960); Polasky, 
supra note 155, at l; Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction Formula Clauses Under 
New Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAXATION 352 (1964). 
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1. "Pecuniary" and "Hybrid" Clauses:160 
a. Assets to be valued at distribution date value; value 
at distribution thus equal to 500,000 dollars. 
(I) Direction to pay the widow or her estate 500,000 
dollars in cash (a general dollar legacy); 
(2) Direction to pay the widow 500,000 dollars in 
cash, or to distribute property with an equivalent value at the 
time of distribution, or to distribute some combination of cash 
and property which would transmit assets with a distribution 
date value of 500,000 dollars. 
b. Assets to be valued at federal estate tax values or 
which may be so valued under specified circumstances. 
(3) Direction to distribute to the widow assets with a 
value for federal estate tax purposes equal to 500,000 dollars. 
(This is typical of problem-pecuniary language.) 
(4) Direction to distribute to the widow assets with 
a value for federal estate tax purposes of 500,000 dollars, but 
in no event having a distribution date value of less than 
160. In view of the spate of decisions involving the issue of whether a particular 
dispositive clause constituted a pecuniary gift or a transfer of a fractional share of the 
estate and the varying interpretations placed upon dispositive language by the trial 
level and appellate courts, it would require a marked degree of bravado for a com-
mentator to attempt to categorize any language as certain to produce either a 
pecuniary gift or a fractional share. E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Kantner, 50 N.J. 
Super. 582, 143 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1958) (increase in value of closely-held stock 
during administration; the lower court held the clause a "fractional share of the 
residue" type; the appellate court held it was a pecuniary, greatly diminishing the 
wife's share); Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 414, 172 A.2d 146, 147 (1961) (increase in 
value of estate during administration; will created a marital trust of "so much of my 
estate [as] ••. shall equal the maximum marital deduction"; a subsequent paragraph 
left the remainder to his children. Rejecting the widow's claim of a right to share in 
estate appreciation (with which the lower court agreed), the appellate court held the 
bequest to be a pecuniary gift, stressing creation of the trust in a separate paragraph 
prior to disposition of the residue); Maguire v. Stirling, 317 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
Other cases posing formula interpretation problems for state courts include, 
Osborn v. Osborn, 334 S.W .2d 48 (Mo. 1960) (abatement of specific bequests to satisfy 
pecuniary formula marital bequest in later paragraph); King v. Citizens &: So. Nat'l 
Bank, 103 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1958) (bequest to widow of "50% of my adjusted gross estate" 
was not reduced by assets passing to the widow outside the estate, but widow was 
not entitled to share in asset appreciation during administration!). Similar to the first 
point in King, supra, is In re Rebens Will, 115 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surr. Ct. 1952). 
The cases are discussed in Durand, Planning Lessons From Marital Deduction 
Litigation, 101 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 8 (1962); Lauritzen, Marital Deduction Bequests, 
8 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 125, 138 (1964). The numerous New York cases (mostly Surrogate's 
court) are collected in Stein, How To Provide for a Marital Deduction by Trust or 
Power of Appointment, in EsTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 117 (Lasser ed. 1964). An interesting 
example of the type of dispositive provision which may confront a court is found in 
Estate of Alan M. Johnson, No. 14814, Orange County J. Ct., Fla., 1958 (will construc-
tion suit involving an attorney's own will: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath to 
----- Bank of ----- Florida, in trust nevertheless, my adjusted gross 
estate. This shall be divided half and half •.• The first half will be Trust A .•• (and) 
would qualify as a marital deduction. • .')! 
The groupings used here are simply for convenience and to illustrate the spectrum 
of shadings from those clauses most likely to be categorized as pecuniary to those most 
likely to be recognized as creating a true fractional share. 
858 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:809 
500,000 dollars. (This is typical of a minimum-value precuniary 
formula designed to satisfy the requirement of Rev. Proc. 64-19.) 
(5) Direction to distribute property with a value of 
500,000 dollars, values to be determined by reference to the 
lower of the aggregate basis of the assets or fair market va}ue 
at date of distribution. -
(6) Direction requiring a distribution of assets with 
a federal estate tax value of 500,000 dollars and so constituted 
that the assets distributed are fairly representative of apprecia-
tion or depreciation in the value of all property available for 
distribution in satisfaction of the bequest. (This type of direc-
tion would represent the ratable-sharing approach to qualifica-
tion within the requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19.) 
c. Distribution of an amount ascertained by reference 
to a fraction of either the residue or particular property: 
(7) Direction to distribute an amount produced by 
the sale of specified assets.161 
(8) Direction to distribute an amount of cash equal 
to a fraction or percentage of the residuary estate (perhaps 
phrased to designate the fractional interest necessary to pro-
duce the maximum marital deduction). 
(9) Direction to distribute assets representing, in 
terms of distribution date values, an aggregate quantum equal 
to the quantum of that fraction of the residue which would 
produce the maximum marital deduction. (Actually, this direc-
tion is similar to the one immediately preceding it, number (8), 
except that it directs the distribution of assets, valued at the 
time of distribution, whose value would equal the cash required 
to be distributed under number (8). A bit of reflection will 
suggest that this is really the basic fractional share clause, with 
the exception that the executor may ascertain the distribution 
date value of the fractional share to which the distributee is 
entitled and satisfy it with selected assets having an aggregate 
value equal to the aggregate value producible by a sharing in 
each asset (a characteristic feature of the true fractional share 
distribution). This type of direction is included at this point 
only for contrast. If satisfiable in cash or in kind, is it a pecu-
niary or a fractional share clause? Perhaps all that can be 
ventured is that one need not describe a zebra as either a horse 
because its conformation is similar to the equine or as a tiger 
because it has stripes!) 
2. Fractional Share Directives and Those Shading into the 
"Hybrid" and "Pecuniary" Areas: 
a. Direction to distribute a fractional share of the residue 
under a fractional share formula as previously described with: 
(10) Distribution to comprise a fractional share of 
each asset available for distribution,162 or 
161. This type of disposition was used in the instrument involved in Commissioner 
v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 8 T.C. 1045 (1947). 
162. The following phrasing is set forth in Casner, supra note 159, at 190 n.3: 
"The numerator of the fraction shall be the maximum estate tax marital deduction 
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(11) Distribution to comprise selected assets whose 
distribution date value would exactly equal that of a distribu-
tion of a fractional share of each asset, or 
(12) Distribution of either assets described as above 
or equivalent cash, or partly in cash and partly in kind (a provi-
sion similar to directive 9), or 
(13) Distribution to be in cash after sale of the assets. 
(It will be noted that this is really a pecuniary bequest, as set 
forth in directive 8.) 
B. Realization of Gain and Loss 
I. True Pecuniary Clauses 
In the first basic hypothetical example,163 the maximum marital 
deduction would have been achieved had the testator simply be-
queathed a sum of 500,000 dollars to his surviving spouse. Receipt 
by the widow of this specific sum from the executor would not 
result in any gross income to her. But since the testator could not 
be certain at the time of executing the will that his adjusted gross 
estate would be exactly 1,000,000 dollars (or any other definitely 
ascertainable sum), he might have bequeathed to his wife a sum 
fixed by operation of a formula directing the executor to pay her 
in dollars that sum which would produce the maximum marital 
deduction. 
It will be noted that this sum is ascertained by computing a 
dollar amount equal to one-half of the value of the adjusted gross 
estate (based upon the federal estate tax value of assets and neces-
sarily expressed in dollars), less the federal estate tax value of dis-
positions otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction. While 
disputes may rage after the decedent's death over the includability 
of assets in the gross estate or over the valuation of such assets for 
federal estate tax purposes, the sum payable to the widow is never-
(allowable in determining the federal estate tax payable by reason of my death) minus 
the value for federal tax purposes of all items in my gross estate which qualify for 
said deduction and which pass or have passed to my said wife (the words 'pass or 
have passed' shall have the same meaning as such words shall have under the provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time of my death) under other provisions 
of this will, by right of survivorship with respect to jointly-owned property, under 
settlement arrangements relating to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under 
this bequest and devise (in computing the numerator, the values as finally determined 
in the federal estate tax proceedings shall control); and the denominator of the frac-
tion shall be the value of my residuary estate, and to the extent that items in my 
residuary estate are included in my gross estate the value at which they are included 
in my gross estate shall control in determining the denominator, and to the extent 
they are not so included, their value at the time they would have been valued if they 
had been so included, shall control in determining the denominator." A somewhat 
revised version appears in CAsNER, EsrATE PLANNING, SUPPLEMENT 308 (1964). 
163. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
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theless ascertainable once there has been a resolution of the factual 
and legal issues. And, laying aside questions of both qualification and 
the allowable quantum of the marital deduction (arising from 
the executor's ability to choose the alternative valuation date164 or 
to vary the adjusted gross estate by his option to take administrative 
expenses and section 2054 deductions as deductions in computing 
either the estate's income tax or federal estate tax165), it is clear that 
the amount ultimately ascertained constitutes a fixed claim against 
the estate assets.166 
a. Gain to Surviving Spouse? 
Applied to the hypothetical case, the marital gift of one-half of 
the adjusted gross estate (amounting to 500,000 dollars) is a fixed 
sum receivable by the widow. The executor has no right to dis-
tribute assets to her with a greater or (assuming assets available for 
distribution are sufficient) a lesser value. 
Absent specification to the contrary in the will, the executor 
normally would be under a duty to convert all personal property, 
except that specifically bequeathed, into cash.167 In the posited case, 
sale of both the A and B stock would result in recognition of long-
term capital gains and losses of 300,000 dollars and 100,000 dollars 
respectively (a "net long-term capital gain" of 200,000 dollars),168 
with resultant income tax consequences. The widow, upon receipt 
o{ her 500,000 dollars, would recognize no gain on the transaction; 
and, assuming that all of the estate's "distributable net income" for 
the year has been distributed to the several beneficiaries pursuant 
to a mandatory direction, receipt by the widow of the corpus dis-
tribution equivalent to her dollar claim should not result in taxable 
income to her.169 
164. I.R.C., § 2032. 
165. For discussion of this question, the administrative problems it poses, and 
suggestions as to how to meet it, see Polasky, supra note 155, at 6. 
166. E.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming 40 B.T.A. 
824 (1939); Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cm,i:. Buu.. 325; Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. 
BULL. 286. 
167. See, e.g., In re Lazar's Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Surr. Ct. 1930); 
I CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 814. Similarly, the beneficiary usually has a right 
to distribution of a pecuniary legacy in cash, absent further specification. The rule is 
not universal, however, and statutory provisions to the contrary may be found. E.g., 
ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 3, § 209 (1961); and see Estate of Comiskey, 24 Ill. App. 2d 
199, 164 N.E.2d 535 (1960). As to limitations, and procedures, in connection with a 
distribution in kind, see Rodman, supra note 149. 
168. I.R.C., § 1222(7). 
169. I.R.C., § 663(a)(l) specifies that the distribution of an amount in satisfaction 
of a bequest of a specific sum of money does not constitute a distribution for purposes 
of allocation of distributable net income and, therefore, does not become gross income 
of the distributee where the amount is actually distributed or distribution is made 
in three or less installments. The normal pecuniary bequest does not specify a time 
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However, it has become common, if not universal, to provide that 
the executor may retain assets in the estate and may distribute assets 
in satisfaction of the general pecuniary legacy170 (the 500,000 dollars 
due the widow). If the executor made a distribution in kind of A 
stock, the widow would receive 3,125 shares (fair market value of 
500,000 dollars at distribution and basis to the estate, equal to 
federal estate tax value, of 312,500 dollars). Again, the widow has 
received exactly what her husband bequeathed to her-a distribu-
tion of assets worth 500,000 dollars in satisfaction of a pecuniary 
legacy of that specific amount; and, as in the preceding example, the 
distribution should have no taxable effect as to her, assuming that 
she is not deemed to have received a share of the estate's distributive 
net income for the year nor an additional amount compensating for 
any delay in distribution of the legacy.171 Further, it seems to be 
accepted that the widow's basis for the shares is the fair market 
value at distribution (equal to her claim) of 500,000 dollars;172 "the 
property was not 'transmitted at death' or 'acquired by bequest ... 
from the decedent' ... [rather the property] ... is acquired in an 
exchange and the legatee's basis would seem to be the value of the 
claim surrendered in exchange for the securities .... "173 
for payment and is deemed to be payable in a single installment during the course of 
administration; this is recognized by the Regulations. Treas. Reg. § l.663(a)-l (1956). 
However, the Regulations specify [Treas. Reg. § l.663(a)-l(b)(l) (1956)] that, "In 
order to qualify as a gift or bequest of a specific sum ••• the amount of money or the 
identity of the specific property must be ascertainable under the terms of a testator's 
will as of the date of his death, [italics added] or under the terms of an inter vivous 
[sic] trust instrument as of the date of the inception of the trust." The Service has 
taken the position that an amount payable under a pecuniary formula clause is not 
ascertainable as of the testator's death and, therefore, within the specific bequest 
exemption of I.R.C., § 663(a)(l). A distribution in satisfaction of the marital gift 
produced by the formula may, therefore, constitute distributable net income amount-
ing to receipt of gross income by the distributee and giving the estate a deduction for 
income tax purposes, absent careful timing of distributions by the executor. The sub-
ject is considered in detail in 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 84. "It remains to 
be seen whether the position taken by the Service in the regulations will be sustained 
by -the courts. But in the absence of decided cases on the question, it is perhaps 
best to assume that the Commissioner is correct ••.. " Stevens, supra note 158, at 273. 
See also Dane, supra note 149, at 114, suggesting, "This problem can be eliminated by 
providing for the marital deduction in an inter vivos trust rather than in a will. In 
that event all that happens is a division of the trust in two on the grantor's death. No 
distribution is involved.'' This approach presents certain problems of its own if the 
marital share is qualified under I.R.C., § 2056(b)(5) and the widow is not entitled to 
the income of both marital and nonmarital portions or trusts. The fractional share 
formula gives rise to the same problem and consequences, see Stevens, supra, at 276; 
Dane, supra, at 114. 
170. 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 814. 
171. I.R.C., § 102; 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 84, 85; see Rev. Rul. 60-87, 
1960-1 CUM. BULL. 286. 
172. Treas. Reg. § l.1014-4(a)(3) (1957); 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 816. 
173. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1940). Bolte, supra note 
157, at 541. See, e.g., Sherman Ewing, 40 B.T .A. 912 (1939). 
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The estate, on the other hand, will be regarded as having realized 
a gain of 187,500 dollars, premised on this same idea of exchanging 
its property for the claim of the widow.174 The theory, as expressed 
in Suisman v. Eaton,115 is that "the property which the ... estate 
received from the 'sale or other disposition' of said stocks was the 
discharge of the corpus from [the legatee's] equitable right to re-
ceive [$500,000] therefrom; the amount realized ... was [$500,000]; 
and the excess of the amount realized over the basis was properly ... 
assessed as part of the taxable income of the estate."176 
2. True Fractional Share Clauses 
a. Gain to the Estate? 
Turning to the other extreme, distribution of assets in satis-
faction of a true fractional share clause should not give rise to any 
gain on the part of the estate; it is simply a distribution of a frac-
tional share of each asset as directed by the testator.177 The dis-
tributee of the legacy, in turn, takes the estate's basis.178 
The point to be noted, then, is that the estate will not be deemed 
to have '!sold or exchanged" property unless (1) it has used estate 
174. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 286; see Treas. Reg. § l.1014-4(a)(3) (1957). 
175. Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. (D. Conn. 1935), afj'd mem., 83 F.2d 1019 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936). 
176. Id. at 115. Similarly, in Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 
1940), the court stated: "In the present case, the legatee had a claim which was a 
charge against the trust estate for [$500,000] • • • in cash or securities and the trustees 
had the power to determine whether the claim should be satisfied in one form or the 
other. The claim, though enforceable only in the alternative, was, like the claim in 
Suisman v. Eaton ••• a charge against the entire trust estate. If it were satisfied by a 
cash payment securities might have to be sold on which (if those actually delivered in 
specie were selected) a taxable gain would necessarily have been realized. Instead of 
making such a sale the trustees delivered the securities and exchanged them 
[emphasis added] pro tanto for the general claim of the legatee, which was thereby 
satisfied. . • • Under circumstances like those here, where the legatee did not take 
securities designated by the will or an interest in the corpus which might be more or 
less at the time of the transfer than at the time of decedent's death, it seems to us that 
the trustees realized a gain by using these securities to settle a claim worth 
[$500,000] ••• just as the trustee in Suisman v. Eaton, realized one.'' 
177. See Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 233; O.D. 667, 3 CUM. BULL. 52 (1920). 
See also 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 817; Cox, Types of Marital Deduction 
Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 909,943 (1957). As some have phrased 
it, "under the fractional share of the residue type of formula, the fiction of sale does 
not apply if distribution is made in kind," Report of Subcommittee on Estate Plan-
ning and the Marital Deduction, 102 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 934, 944 (1963). 
178. I.R.C., § 1014. If the distribution in kind is deemed to be income under I.R.C., 
§ 662 because of inapplicability of § 663(a)(l) as discussed in note 169 supra, the 
distributee receives a basis equal to the fair market value at date of distribution. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.66l(a)-2(f)(3). This does not, however, mean that the estate realizes 
gain on the distribution. See Treas. Reg. § l.66l(a)-2(f)(l). 
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assets to satisfy a fixed obligation to distribute a specified dollar 
amount and (2) the dollar amount is satisfied with assets having a 
basis to the estate which is not equal to that specified amount. The 
dollar amount need not be determinable at the time of the decedent's 
death; it is sufficient that the distributee's claim be measured by a 
specific sum at the time of distribution.179 
Where the distributee's rights are simply to receive a fractional 
share of property comprising the residue or to receive property 
equal in value to that share, it seems clear that the distribution is 
not an exchange or constructive sale of the property in satisfaction 
of a specific, fixed dollar claim. 
b. Gain to the Surviving Spouse'! 
Similarly, the widow who has only the right to receive a frac-
tional share of property cannot be said to have realized a gain or 
loss, even though the property distributed to her has appreciated or 
depreciated during administration.180 She has not sold or exchanged 
anything; she has simply received a distribution of estate assets in 
accordance with testamentary instructions. 
This is not to suggest, however, that a distribution pursuant to 
a fractional share formula may not result in recognition of income. 
Suppose, for example, that the will contained a true fraction of 
the residue clause by virtue of which the widow was entitled to a 
fractional share of each asset, and let us assume her share figures out 
to one-half. Assume further that the residuary estate against which 
the fraction is to be applied consists of 1,000 shares of A stock now 
worth 100,000 dollars (federal estate tax value of 40,000 dollars) and 
Greenacres, a tract of valuable undeveloped real estate now worth 
100,000 dollars (federal estate tax value of 60,000 dollars). The 
executor, a practical fellow, suggests that while the widow is entitled 
to one-half of each asset it would make better sense for her to 
receive all of one asset or the other. Economically, the result would 
be the same as the distribution of a fractional interest in each asset as 
the will directs. The widow agrees and receives Greenacres, the stock 
being retained by the estate for ultimate distribution to other resid-
uary beneficiaries. 
May it be suggested that the widow realized, and must recognize, 
179. This was the situation in Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 
1948), discussed at text accompanying notes 200-07 infra. A "sale or other disposition," 
giving the distributee a new basis equivalent to the distribution date value of the 
distribution, was found in a similar situation in Lindsay C. Howard, 23 T.C. 962 
(1955). 
180. Seel CAsNER, op. cit. supra note 158, at 817. 
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a gain in accord with the doctrine of Rouse v. Commissioner?181 
The theory would be that she had a vested interest in one-half of 
the stock (basis of her interest 20,000 dollars) which she exchanged 
for the additional one-half interest in Greenacres (that one-half 
interest having a fair market value of 50,000 dollars), thus realizing 
a gain of 30,000 dollars.182 Further, since this is not a "like-kind 
transaction,"183 neither section 1031 nor any other section of the 
Internal Revenue Code would seem to afford a ground for post-
poning recognition of the gain.184 For such solace as it might afford, 
characterization of the transaction as an "exchange" would seem to 
afford the opportunity for capital gains treatment and the widow's 
basis for Greenacres would appear to be 80,000 dollars (30,000 dol-
lars for her original half-interest185 and 50,000 dollars for the newly 
acquired half-interest,186 with the holding period of the latter begin-
ning to run as of the date of acquisition187). Similarly, the transferor 
of the one-half interest in Greenacres might be deemed to have 
realized a recognizable gain, having exchanged that interest (basis 
30,000 dollars) for an additional one-half of the stock worth 50,000 
dollars. 
Presumably, if the executor had been given the power, either 
expressly or by implicatiqn, to distribute specific assets with a distri-
bution date value equal to the value of the computed fractional share 
of the residue available for satisfying the dispositive direction, no 
"exchange" of interests would have occurred. But attempts to avoid 
the hypothetical possibility of capital gain by mongrelization of the 
true fractional share disposition may not be wholly successful and 
are not without their own side effects. It has been suggested: 
"[G]iving the executor discretion on distribution to allocate 
property to the nonmarital share and to transfer to the marital 
share from the nonmarital share property of equivalent value 
in place thereof ... should not be a taxable exchange but it 
may be regarded as giving the executor the power to establish a 
dollar claim in favor of the marital share when property is taken 
from the marital share and given to the nonmarital share. If so, 
the satisfaction of the dollar claims may conceivably produce a 
taxable gain."188 
181. 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947), affirming 6 T.C. 908 (1946). Cf. Frances R. Walz, 
32 B.T.A. 718 (1935) which the Tax Court distinguished. For a firm statement that 
capital gains may result in this type of situation, see Casner, supra note 159, at 277. 
182. I.R.C., § 1001. 
183. I.R.C., § 1031. 
184. I.R.C., § 1002. 
185. I.R.C., § 1014. 
186. I.R.C., § 1012. 
187. I.R.C., § 1223. 
188. Casner, supra note 159, at 277. See also Bolte, supra note 157, at 541; Peeler, 
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Further, the observation has been made that the executor may be 
obligated to distribute in such a manner that each legatee or re-
mainder will "have the same cost basis if his share is to be in equal 
proportion to the others, and how can the fiduciary effect such 
equalization except by an actual or constructive sale of the prop-
erty?"189 The problem posed refers to the fact that distribution of 
property with equal value at distribution date, but with different 
tax bases, will result in an unequal allocation of potentiality of 
gain or loss upon subsequent disposition by the legatee.190 A further 
administrative factor is that such distributions require a second 
valuation, often a difficult problem where closely-held stock is in-
cluded.191 Even those who would advocate the granting of such 
powers of allocation recognize the existence of additional, potentially 
troublesome administrative problems, absent skillful planning and 
drafting.192 
3. Hybrids-Tax-Value Clauses 
Having looked at the extremes-the bequest of a pecuniary 
amount and the true fractional share-what are the income tax 
results of clauses in the middle range of the spectrum? For example, 
what are the tax effects of the two types of "tax-value" pecuniary 
formula clauses designed to comply with Rev. Proc. 64-19? 
When the draftsman uses a "tax-value" pecuniary clause to avoid 
recognition of gain by the estate upon distribution of appreciated 
assets in satisfaction of the marital bequest, the results should be 
quite different from those arising from distribution of appreciated 
assets in satisfaction of a fixed amount claim. Whether the will 
simply provides for a bequest of "assets with a basis of 500,000 dol-
lars" or utilizes a pecuniary formula clause granting the executor 
Unsuspected Reali%lltion of Profit in Estates and Trusts, 98 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 1191, 
1193 (1959). 
189. Roberts &: Muller, supra note 158, at 378. See also Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 
103 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 536, 538 (1964). 
190. Roberts &: Muller, supra note 158, at 377. 
191. See Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction Formula Clauses Under New 
Rev. Proc. 64-19, 20 J. TAXATION 352, 355 (1964). 
192. See Rodman, supra note 149. Suppose, for example, the executor could allocate 
to the marital trust stock of either Company A or Company B, both of which have a 
fair market value at this time of $200,000. However, the federal estate tax basis of 
the A stock is $250,000 while the basis of the B stock is only $50,000. If the stock of 
Company A is allocated to the widow's trust, might not the remaindermen of the 
nonmarital trust question a capital gains tax paid by the trust upon sale of the B 
stock at a profit? 
Suppose, further, the executor elects to allocate to the marital trust all of the stock 
in a family business or all of the interest in an oil and gas field having tremendous 
potential. If such assets do better over the years than the assets of like value allocated 
to the nonmarital trust might not the remaindermen challenge the impartiality or 
judgment of the fiduciary in making such allocation? 
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the power to select assets (valued as for federal estate tax purposes) 
to satisfy the bequest in kind, it seems clear that the widow is not 
entitled to specific assets, nor to a set fractional share of the estate 
(unless otherwise required by local law), nor to a specific amount or 
claim against the estate. She is simply entitled to a distribution 
satisfying the terms of her husband's dispositive provision; assuming 
changes in asset values between date of death and date of distribu-
tion, the quantum she receives may vary markedly with the shift in 
actual values of assets and the manner of exercise of the discretionary 
power granted the fiduciary. 
In carrying out the direction, the executor would first have to 
determine the "bench mark" for measuring the gift in terms of the 
tax basis. On the hypothetical facts, the bench mark is 500,000 
dollars (the figure representing one-half of the adjusted gross estate 
and, accordingly, the maximum marital deduction), which is to be 
satisfied with assets having a federal estate tax value (or basis) equal 
to that figure. Absent any further requirement of local law193 or of a 
tax agreement194 restricting the executor's discretion in selecting 
assets to satisfy the bequest, distribution of either all of the A stock 
or all of the B stock would comply with the testamentary direction. 
The executor has not satisfied any fixed dollar amount claim with 
assets having a different basis; rather, he has simply exercised the 
power apparently vested in him to allocate estate assets in satisfaction 
of a bequest of an indefinite portion of the estate. Similarly, the 
widow has not exchanged a fixed-amount claim; rather, she has 
simply received a portion of the estate pursuant to the special power 
of the executor to determine the quantum she is to receive. Thus, 
from an income tax standpoint, the transaction would result in 
neither gain nor loss to either the estate or the distributee.195 
193. E.g., N.Y. DECED. Esr. I.Aw § 125·2. It has been held that this statute requires 
that even though the executor is given power to select assets to satisfy the pecuniary 
gift, the allocation must be made in such manner as to result in equivalent sharing of 
appreciation and depreciation by the respective beneficiaries. In re Bush's Will, 2 App. 
Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 145 N.E.2d 872 (1957). But 
see note 69 supra. See discussion of the rationale of the statute in Rodman, supra note 
149, at 804. In re Bush's Will and subsequent cases are explored in detail in the 
articles cited supra note 160. The Internal Revenue Service now recognizes that New 
York law is "clear" in requiring that the widow share in appreciation and depreciation 
and indicates that pecuniary bequests and formulas containing the "problem pecuni• 
ary" language ~ill qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction. Private Ruling 
from Lester H. Wallace, Acting Chief, Estate and Gift Tax Branch, IRS, to Fiduciary 
Trust Co. of New York, P-H FEDERAL TAXES 1J 142051 (1965). See Nicolai v. Hoffman, 
232 Ore. 105, 373 P.2d 967 (1962) (direction to use federal estate values in ascertaining 
the quantum to satisfy the pecuniary bequest held to require a mandatory sharing of 
appreciation). The case is discussed in Stevens, supra note 191, at 353, and Lauritzen, 
supra note 160, at 145. 
194. As where the agreements required by Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 3 and 5 are executed. 
195. Again it will be noted that such a distribution might constitute gross income 
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The pecuniary marital bequest (whether specified amount or 
formula-determined) may utilize problem-pecuniary language (as it 
has been defined herein), subject to a further requirement (under 
either the express terms of the dispositive instrument, local law, 
or an effective tax agreement of the type referred to in Rev. Proc. 
64-19) that the assets so allocated (1) shall have a distribution date 
value not less than the marital deduction allowed with respect to 
such assets or (2) shall be fairly representative of aggregate apprecia-
tion or depreciation in the value of distributable assets to the date 
of distribution. 
a. Minimum-Value Pecuniaries 
Under the first type of clause, the so-called minimum-value 
pecuniary, the income tax results should be similar to those just 
considered under the old problem-pecuniary language. Although the 
widow is assured of a minimum amount to the same extent as would 
be afforded by an outright specific bequest of that specified sum, the 
fair market value of assets distributed may exceed the minimum, 
subject only to the discretionary power of the executor or further 
limitations such as a local law requirement of a ratable sharing. 
Therefore, the ultimate value of the bequest is not ascertainable 
until distribution; and receipt of assets cannot be said to be in satis-
faction of a fixed dollar amount bequest or claim. 
Regardless of the value of the assets distributed, the widow has 
not sold, exchanged, or relinquished a fixed dollar amount claim for 
assets worth more or less than the fixed claim; she has simply 
received a distribution in accordance with the testamentary provi-
sion. Assuming it does not constitute distributable net income of 
the estate, the widow should have no recognizable income as a 
consequence. 
While the executor presumably could have satisfied the bequest 
with a distribution of cash or assets having a distribution date value 
of 500,000 dollars, he is clearly not satisfying a fixed-amount claim 
with assets having a different basis. Further, by definition, the basis 
of the assets distributed must be exactly equal to the only amount 
(a distribution date value of 500,000 dollars) of which the widow is 
assured. Thus there can be no gain to the estate; neither can there 
be a loss when the distribution is viewed as the exercise of a power 
granted to the executor and not as an exchange or sale. Nothing in 
(in the form of distributable net income) to the clistributee under the Service's posi-
tion that such a transfer does not constitute a distribution of a specific sum of money 
for purposes of I.R.C., § 663(a)(l). Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 286; see notes 
169-71 supra. 
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Kenan,196 Suisman,191 Rev. Rul. 56-270,198 or Rev. Rul. 60-87199 
would seem to require a different result since each deals with a 
situation requiring that assets distributed must have a distribution 
date value of a specified amount; that is quite different from a 
variable amount limited only by a specified minimum. 
b. "Ratable-Sharinft' and "Lower of Basis or Distribution 
Date" Tax-Value Clauses 
As in the case of the minimum-value clause, there should be no 
recognized gain or loss upon satisfaction of the tax-value pecuniary 
formula of either the ratable-sharing or lower-of-federal-estate-tax-
or-distribution-date value type. In the latter case, the widow had 
no definite claim and the income tax consequences of satisfaction of 
the bequest should be similar to those outlined under the minimum-
value clause. This should be the case also where the ratable-sharing 
pecuniary is used. In that case, however, though the widow had no 
ascertainable claim at the date of establishing federal estate 
tax values, it may be argued that her claim, in terms of then 
current dollars, may be definitely ascertained as of the date of dis-
tribution. Would distribution, therefore, be satisfying a fixed claim? 
It is believed that it should not; yet, one case merits consideration. 
c. Implications of Brinckerhoff 
Brinckerhoff v. Commissioner200 contains language which might 
prove troublesome. Hopefully the case will be confined to its precise 
factual situation: The testatrix. had directed that certain property be 
sold at a later date and that the proceeds be divided among four 
legatees. Instead of being sold, however, the property was distributed 
to the legatees, who released the executors from any liability for 
failure to carry out the direction. Upon a sale of the property some 
thirteen years later, the Second Circuit held that the legatees had 
received a basis equal to the value of the property when distributed 
to them. 
If the testamentary direction had been to distribute a pro-rata 
share of the property to each legatee, it seems clear that each would 
have received a basis equal to that of the estate (and with no recogni-
196. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940). 
197. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), affd mem., 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
299 U.S. 573 (1963). 
198. 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 325. 
199. 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 286. 
200. 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 8 T.C. 1045 (1947). See also Lindsay C. 
Howard, 23 T.C. 962 (1955); Wilson v. Tomlinson, 306 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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tion of gain). Yet the court, citing Kenan201 and Suisman202 and 
emphasizing that the legatees were entitled to a mandatory cash 
distribution, stated: 
"A tax liability however arose against the executors when 
the stock was transferred to the tax.payers in exchange for a 
release of their claims as legatee-beneficiaries to the cash proceeds 
which the executors would have realized had they instead ex-
ercised the mandatory power of sale given them under the will. 
We have heretofore held that the use of the executor of prop-
erty of the estate to satisfy a legatee's claim for cash payment 
is a tax.able transaction in which gain or loss of the estate is to 
be recognized to the extent of the difference between the estate's 
basis and the value of the cash liability satisfied."203 
While recognizing that the cited cases involved only cash legacies of 
fixed amounts unaffected by fluctuation in the value of the property 
out of which the legacy was satisfiable, the court reasoned: 
"The taxpayers had no interest in the real estate during the 
period of its increase in value but only in such cash as they 
might receive from the exercise of the executor's power of sale. 
The real estate itself belong to the executors in trust who re-
tained the title until it was disposed of .... The present case is 
therefore to be distinguished not from other legacies which are 
of a fixed amount in cash but from gifts which belong as such 
to the legatee under a will of property. The fact that the ulti-
mate value realized by the taxpayers in the present case depends 
upon the fluctuating value of the property devised to the execu-
tors does not affect our conclusion .... "204 
Several interpretations and limitations may be placed on 
Brinckerhoff. Most restrictively, and preferably, it may be argued 
that it simply holds that where the will contains a mandatory direc-
tion to sell assets and distribute cash, even a distribution in kind 
will be treated as if the estate sold the asset for its distribution date 
value. A gain will be recognized to the extent the distribution date 
value exceeds the estate's basis, and a basis equal to the value of 
the assets received will be passed on to the distributee who is deemed 
a purchaser. 
The language employed, however, is capable of a broader inter-
pretation: namely, that whenever a dollar amount, or the dollar 
value of the quantum of property required to be distributed at dis-
201. 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940). 
202. 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), afj'd mem., 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
299 U.S. 573 (1936). 
203. 168 F.2d at 440. 
204. Id. at 440. (Emphasis added.) 
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tribution date, is measurable at distribution date as a fixed dollar 
amount, then use of property with a lesser basis will result in both 
a gain to the estate and a new basis, equal to distribution date value, 
for the distributee. Although even this interpretation should create 
no problems of potential gain under a minimum-value pecuniary 
clause (since no fixed value amount is involved), it could result in 
a claim of gain where the ratable-sharing pecuniary is used since the 
executor must distribute assets "fairly representative" (and this 
might be regarded as meaning "equal") of appreciation and deprecia-
tion. When the executor values the assets at distribution date and, 
as in the case of a fractional share clause which does not require 
pro-rata distribution of a share of each asset, determines the value 
of the share to which the distributee is entitled, he has calculated 
a definite amount which will be satisfied with assets having a current 
value of that amount.205 
The danger is not lessened by the court's statement that, "The 
fact that the ultimate value realized by the taxpayers in the present 
case depends upon the fluctuating value of the property devised to 
the executors does not affect our conclusion."206 
It would be ironic, indeed, if the executor achieved th<; same 
result as under a true fractional share by actually distributing an 
undivided fractional share of each asset to the marital share (avoid-
ing the necessity of a second valuation of the assets on the distribu-
tion date and fi11essing any problems or claims of favoritism arising 
from selection of assets with differing tax bases and potentiality for 
future capital gains207), and yet gain resulted to the estate because 
the executor could have selected assets to satisfy an ascertainable 
dollar amount obligation! 
The presence of even such a slight cloud may suggest the desir-
ability of using either the minimum-value tax-value pecuniary or 
a fractional-share provision in preference to a ratable-sharing bequest. 
After all, the task of the planner of estates is not to speculate 
on the probability of danger, however slight, where a safer course 
is available. 
205. In this situation, a claim of gain has at least as strong a basis as it has when 
the executor, operating under a fractional share clause, has power to allocate specific 
property to the nonmarital share and to transfer property of equivalent value to the 
marital share. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. Dean Casner has suggested 
that the latter situation may be viewed as a grant to the executor of "the power to 
establish a dollar claim in favor of the marital share." Casner, supra note 159, at 277. 
206. 168 F .2d at 440. 
207. See note 189 supra and accompanying text. 
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4. Summary of Gain 
In summary, the possibility of gain or loss to the estate and a new 
basis and holding period for the distributee should arise only where 
assets having a basis different from distribution date values are used 
to satisfy a fixed dollar obligation due the distributee. 
A typical example of a disposition deemed to give rise to this 
result is the direction to distribute assets having an aggregate distri-
bution date value equal to a specified sum (such as 500,000 dollars) or 
equal to that sum necessary to produce the maximum marital deduc-
tion as determined by a formula (illustrative directive 2).208 (Obvi-
ously a direction, as in illustrative directives 1, 8, and 13, to dis-
tribute cash would not in itself produce gain; the sale of assets to 
raise the cash might have this result, however.) 
Where the direction is to satisfy a pecuniary bequest, whether 
of a stated amount or determined by formula, with selected assets 
valued at their estate tax values (the problem-pecuniary language 
giving rise to Rev. Proc. 64-19 and illustrated by directive 3) no 
gain should result. But what of additions to that language designed 
to comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19? The addition 
of a provision that the aggregate distribution date value of assets 
so distributed must be at least equal to the pecuniary amount (the 
minimum-value pecuniary clause as illustrated by directive 4) should 
not result in realization of gain since the widow's rights are clearly 
not equal to a fixed monetary sum. This would also be true of the 
addition of a provision that the assets distributed should be valued, 
for distribution purposes, at the lower of their federal estate tax 
value or fair market value at date of distribution (illustrated by 
directive 5). But, because it might be deemed to establish a fixed 
amount due at distribution date, though satisfiable in property, illus-
trative directive 6 (a ratable-sharing pecuniary direction) might con-
ceivably be characterized as having created a fixed pecuniary claim 
at the date of distribution with a resultant possibility of gain to 
the estate should the distribution date value of distributed assets 
exceed basis. A direction to distribute a "fractional share" of the 
estate with power to select and distribute assets (or perhaps cash) 
equal in value to the share rather than distributing fractional 
interests in assets (illustrative directions 9, 11, and 12) would present 
similar problems. Even more clearly, a provision requiring the 
208. The illustrative directive clauses are set forth in the text at the beginning of 
Part IV of this article, supra. 
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distribution of an amount produced by the sale of specified assets 
( directive 7) would, under the reasoning of the Brinckerhofj209 case, 
produce gain where the proceeds of sale or distribution date value 
of the assets exceeded basis. 
Distribution of a true fractional share should not result in gain 
to the estate since it clearly does not represent satisfaction of a claim 
but is simply a distribution of inheritance-the prescribed fractional 
interest in property bequeathed to the distributee.210 Yet, while none 
of the directives would give rise to realization of gain by the dis-
tributee211 since she would not be selling or exchanging anything, 
her agreement to accept an additional interest in one asset in lieu 
of the fractional interest in another asset to which she was specifically 
entitled could result in gain to her as well as to the transferor.212 
C. Other Income Tax Questions 
Only when the distribution gives rise to gain need the succeed-
ing questions of the hierarchy of key tax questions be answered. But, 
if a gain has been realized, it will be necessary to determine the 
amount (by reference to the value of the consideration received and 
the basis of the asset transferred), to ascertain whether the gain must 
be recognized (since an exchange of like-kind assets in the case of 
trading fractional interests might be a like-kind transaction within 
the definition set forth in section 1031 of the Code), and to determine 
whether the gain, if recognized, may be treated as a long-term capital 
gain resulting from a sale or exchange213 of a transferred asset deemed 
held for the requisite period of time.214 
D. Suggestions for Drafting and Administration 
Just as the discussion of possibilities of gain on distribution 
have pre-empted an inordinate portion of this article, so have 
thoughtful writers215 suggested that the preoccupation with the gains 
problem has been overemphasized, though an occasional commenta-
tor may have ventured a contrary opinion.216 
209. 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 8 T.C. 1045 (1947). 
210. Bolte, Choosing a Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 532, 
541 (1961). 
211. SURREY&: WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 666 (1960 ed.). 
212. See Treas. Reg. 1.1001-l(a) (1957). 
213. I.R.C., § 1222. The question whether the debtor engages in a sale or exchange 
in these situations does not seem to be seriously questioned. "Most of the cases involve 
the issue whether any gain is realized, and if gain does result it is apparently assumed 
to be capital gain." SURREY &: WARREN, op. cit. supra note 211, at 666. 
214. 1 CAsNER, EsTATE PLANNING 818 (3d ed. 1961), discusses the question. 
215. See, e.g., Bolte, supra note 210, at 536; Stevens, supra note 191, at 353. 
216. See, e.g., Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, Tax Coun• 
selor's Q., June 1959, pp. 1, 51. 
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Often, the problem of potential recognition of gain can be 
minimized by an appropriate selection of assets to be distributed 
to the marital share. Although there may have been a major increase 
in aggregate asset217 values during the period of administration, 
there will usually be some assets that have increased little, if at all.218 
Of course, if the bulk of the estate consists of the stock of a closely-
held corporation, significant gains may be realized in the process 
of administration and distribution.219 Yet even this situation should 
not be viewed as catastrophic. The tax-oriented testator and drafts-
man normally seek overall tax minimization.220 Use of the pecuniary 
bequest directing a definitely ascertainable fixed amount should 
produce the maximum marital deduction while directing apprecia-
tion during administration to the nonmarital share.221 This same 
result can usually be obtained by using a minimum-value type of 
pecuniary clause specifying use of federal estate tax values to avoid 
recognition of gain; however, a rather general across-the-board in-
crease in asset values will require some allocation of appreciation to 
the marital share, although its effect may be minimized by selection 
of those assets with the smallest percentage of increased value. 
The basic difference, then, between the pecuniary amount satis-
fiable at distribution-date values and the tax-value pecuniary (direct-
ing use of federal estate tax value in computing the distributable 
quantum, coupled with a provision that distribution date values may 
not be less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest) arises where 
appreciated assets must be distributed in satisfaction of the 
217. Bolte, supra note 210, at 536; Report of Subcommittee on Forms for Marital 
Deduction Planning, 103 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 961, 962 (1964); Report of Subcommittee · 
on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, 102 TRUSTS &: ESTATES, 934, 944 (1963); 
Stevens, supra note 191, at 353. 
218. Bolte, supra note 210; Stevens, supra note 191. 
219. The severity of the problem depends upon the degree to which relief provi-
sions, such as I.R.C., § 303, may be utilized within a short time after death as well as 
the presence and effect of buy-sell agreements setting effective estate tax valuations. 
These problems are discussed in detail in a series of three articles: Polasky, Planning 
for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Business (pts. 1-3), 44 
IOWA L. REV. 83 (1958), 45 IOWA L. REV. 46 (1959), 46 IOWA L. REv. 516 (1961). 
220. Bolte, supra note 210, at 536. 
221. This is not indicative of an "anti-widow" attitude. The will may provide that 
income from the nonmarital portion be distributed to the widow, that she have a 
special power of appointment over the nonmarital share, and the distributions of 
corpus may be made by the corporate fiduciary for her benefit. See Craven, Marital 
Deduction Problems-Use of the Percentage Formula Clause, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON 
Fm. TAX. 613, 615 (1961), citing In re Estate of Uhl, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), and 
Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1!45). The formula simply 
allocates appreciation to the nonmarital share in order to avoid inclusion of such 
assets in the widow's estate, thus minimizing estate taxes imposed upon her death. 
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bequest. The former gives rise to recognition of gain to the estate 
and directs all appreciation to the nonmarital share; the latter avoids 
recognition of gain but augments the marital share by at least a 
portion of the appreciation. As a practical matter, this type of situa-
tion will not be frequently encountered and the use of either may 
effectively avoid net taxable gains and at the same time direct ap-
preciation to the nonmarital share. 
Again using an adjusted gross estate comprised of A stock with a 
federal estate tax value of 500,000 dollars (distribution date value of 
800,000 dollars) and B stock with a federal estate tax value of 500,000 
dollars (distribution date value 400,000 dollars), the suggestion may 
be illustrated. 
I. Using Distribution Date Values 
Assuming that assets are to be valued at their actual distribution 
date value in satisfying the bequest, the wife could be given all of 
the B stock (fair market value 400,000 dollars) and one-eighth of the 
A stock (fair market value 100,000 dollars) resulting in a net "loss"222 
to the estate of 62,500 dollars (100,000 dollar loss on B and 37,500 
dollar gain on A), with allocation of the entire appreciation to the 
nonmarital share. Conversely, the executor might distribute A stock 
with a distribution date value of 500,000 dollars (basis of 312,500 
dollars) causing the estate to recognize a gain of 187,500 dollars but 
with the net appreciation in asset values flowing to the nonmarital 
share. 
Where the estate and gains are much smaller than those hypothe-
sized, recognition of gain by the estate might actually, though rarely, 
be desirable. For example, if the estate's income tax bracket were 
forty per cent, the effective rate on the gain would be twenty per 
cent.223 If the widow were in a sixty per cent bracket and, for some 
reason, would have occasion to sell the stock, the minimum effective 
rate (assuming no offsetting losses and the required holding period) 
would be twenty-five per cent.224 Thus, gain to the estate and a conse-
222. This assumes no impediment to deduction of the loss offsetting the gain. It 
seems clear that the loss could be realized and recognized by a sale on the open 
market. But what of a distribution by the executor to the obligee-beneficiary? I.R.C., 
§ 267 does forestall recognition of loss in certain circumstances (e.g., a transaction be• 
tween a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of a trust [§ 267(b)(6)] or a fiduciary of 
another trust [§ 267 (b)(5)]; the pour-over from an inter vivos trust to a marital trust 
might well run afoul of these provisions)? However, nothing in §§ 267(a) or (c) would 
appear specifically to deny recognition of the loss upon distribution by the executor to 
the obligee-beneficiary. 
223. I.R.C., § 1202. 
224. I.R.C., § 1201. 
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quently higher basis for the widow could conceivably result in lower 
overall taxes.225 
In the more typical situation, the executor might work out the 
distribution so that no net gain or loss would result. For example, 
he might allocate one-fourth of the A stock and three-fourths of the 
B stock with the following results: 
Basis to 
Fair Market Gain or Widow of 
Assets Value at (Loss) to Distributed 
Allocated Basis Distribution Estate Shares 
A (1/4 of 
shares) $125,000 $200,000 $75,000 $200,000 
B(¾of 
shares) 375,000 300,000 (75,000) 300,000 
Total or 
Net $500,000 $500,000 -0- $500,000 
It will be noted that, while the widow's total basis is 500,000 dollars, 
as was the estate's, the allocation has been reshuffled to accord with 
values actually existing at the time of distribution. This minimizes 
the potentiality of gain or loss to the widow on disposition of a por-
tion of the distributed assets.226 
2. Using Federal Estate Tax Values 
Under a tax-value clause of the minimum-value type, satisfaction 
of the bequest with A stock only would require distribution of all 
of the shares and, though no gain would be realized, the value of the 
shares would exceed the allowable marital deduction by 300,000 
dollars; this is in contrast to the gain recognized on distribution of 
500,000 dollars worth of A shares where distribution date values 
were used in calculating the quantum of stock necessary to satisfy 
the bequest. 
225. The strained nature of the example should be recognized. Should the widow 
retain the distributed assets, they would receive a new stepped-up basis upon her 
death whether or not she recognized gain at the time of distribution. I.R.C., § 1014. 
And, of course, the widow might be in a 40% bracket and the estate in a 60% 
bracket with the result that a distribution to the widow prior to sale and without 
recognition of gain on distribution would result in a lower tax rate on the gain. 
Where the distributed assets were made the subject of a gift, the donee's basis in 
turn would be affected by whether or not gain had been recognized on distribution, 
the donee succeeding to the donor's basis subject to appropriate adjustments. I.R.C., 
§ 1015. 
226. Compare the resulting basis in this instance to that of a similar distribution 
under a minimum-value clause. See note 227 infra. 
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Finally, the executor might distribute three-fourths of the B 
stock and one-fourth of the A stock, an appropriate distribution 
under either formula. In this case, there would be no net gain or 
loss;· the only difference would be that under the tax-value clause 
the assets would retain the same basis as that of the transferor (375,000 
dollars for the B shares and 125,000 dollars for the A shares).227 
There would be no "over-funding" of the marital share, since the 
aggregate appreciation accrues to the nonmarital portion. 
Perhaps the illustration has been sufficient to indicate that in 
the normal case neither type of formula clause (despite their differing 
operative effects) need give rise either to recognition of net gain or 
to allocation of appreciation to the marital share. It may be 
suggested that the dragon is not as dreadful as rumored. 
V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TYPES 
OF FORMULA CLAUSES-A COMPARISON 
A. Formula Versus Non-Formula 
Perhaps a few tentative inferences, if not conclusions, may now 
be drawn as to the desirability of various types of formula clauses, 
subject always to the caveat that each client's situation will be some-
what unique and choice of a pattern must be made, if at all, in the 
light of the factors involved in the particular situation. 
The debate over the desirability of using a formula clause has 
spanned the life of the marital deduction228 and is likely to con-
tinue,229 though it may be forecast that a trend will develop toward 
227. The basis of the B shares would be $300,000 and that of the A shares $200,000 
under the pecuniary bequest that values assets at distribution date values. Cf. Colson, 
The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 10 THE PRACTICAL LAw. 69, 
79 (1964), suggesting avoidance of attempted qualification under the "minimum-
value" approach for reasons based upon that author's interpretation of Rev. Proc. 
64-19. 
228. See, e.g., the delightful exchange in Sargent, To Each His Own, 93 TRUSTS 8: 
EsrATES 933 (1954); Trachtman, Leaping in the Dark, 93 TRUSTS 8: EsrATES 922 (1954), 
and Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43 B.U.L. REv. 179 (1963); Tracht-
man, Marital Deduction-Use of Non-Formula Provisions, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON 
FED. TAX. 631 (1961). See also Sargent, A.B.C. and D. of Marital Deduction, 92 TRUSTS 
8: EsrATES 746 (1953). 
229. Stevens, supra note 191. A recent Trachtman-Sargent exchange, unfortunately 
reported only briefly under the intriguing title of Dialogue on Eschatology, in 102 
TRUSTS 8: ESTATES 932 (1963), featured the annual Meeting of the Section of Real 
Property, Probate and Trust Law in August 1963 in Chicago. To the author, who 
served as "moderator" (and the term is moderately descriptive) of that exchange and 
served with Messrs. Trachtman and Sargent on a panel which discussed "Common 
Sense in Estate Planning" at the University of Illinois-Illinois Bar Association 1964 
Short Course on Estate Planning held in Champaign in April 1964, it appeared that 
basic views of these friendly feuders had not appreciably changed in the past decade. 
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a middle ground. In that event, there will be less dependence upon 
the formula as the major source of funding the marital share and 
less reluctance to use it as a "backup" clause to obtain the maximum 
marital deduction under circumstances unforeseen or unforeseeable 
at the planning stage. The arguments have been marshalled ably and 
at length elsewhere.230 
Briefly stated, the opponent of such clauses will suggest that the 
formula will not operate where assets providing more than the 
desired marital deduction pass to the spouse apart from the disposi-
tive instrument;231 but this hardly seems disadvantageous other than 
in terms of wasted effort. The opponent may also suggest that it will 
create uncertainty as to the amount (or quantum of assets) ultimately 
passing to the widow;232 this will be true in the case of a fractional-
share formula just as in the gift of a non-formula fraction of an as yet 
undetermined estate.233 The choice, then, would appear to be between 
securing the maximum allowable marital deduction and providing 
a specific sum for the widow (which can also be done by a bequest 
preceding the formula). A somewhat more serious objection is that 
the time for determining the composition of the marital gift will 
be delayed due to dependence on estate tax determinations, though 
the problems created thereby are somewhat less in· the case of the 
true pecuniary than in the case of the fractional share. 
It may be suggested that the formula clause will create conflicts 
of interest between the spouse and other legatees;234 but these are 
certainly not unknown in non-formula dispositions. Indeed, prob-
lems arising from the election to take administrative expenses as 
deductions for estate tax or income tax purposes,235 from the deter-
230. Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15TH lNsr. oN FED. 
TAX. 909, 915 (1957); Craven, Marital Deduction Problems-Use of the Percentage 
Formula Clause, supra note 221, at 615; Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning 
and the Marital Deduction, supra note 217, at 943; Mannheimer, Wheeler &: Friedman, 
The Use of a Formula Clause for the Marital Deduction, 32 TAXES 381, 386 (1954). 
231. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 217, at 943. 
232. Ibid.; Craven, supra note 221, at 617. 
233. Ibid. 
234. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 217, at 943; Craven, supra note 221, at 619. 
235. For a detailed mathematical analysis and suggested palliative, see Polasky, 
supra note 216, at 10. Some forms utilize a formula clause providing, "If my wife ••. 
survives me • • . I give her . . . an amount equal to one-half of the value of my 
adjusted gross taxable estate, as determined for federal estate tax purposes, after 
deducting all debts and funeral and administration expenses, but before deducting 
succession taxes, less the value of other property qualifying." (Emphasis added.) In 
Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), it was held 
that although the administration expenses were deducted on the estate's income tax 
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mination of rights to income accruing during administration on 
"expended assets,"236 as well as from a host of other administrative 
decisions,237 must be foreseen and prudently handled whether the 
dispositive instrument contains a formula clause or not. To the 
extent that such conflicts could arise from the fiduciary's power to 
prefer one or other through selection of assets,238 the problems may 
be ameliorated by an appropriately drafted formula clause; yet it 
cannot be gainsaid that pivoting the widow's share on the determina-
tion of the adjusted gross estate for federal estate tax values does 
tend to make her interest adverse to that of the residuary legatees 
when questions arise as to the election of the alternative valuation 
date239 or includability of assets in the gross estate for estate tax 
purposes.240 
Another argument in opposition to formula clauses is that they 
breed difficult problems of construction241 for courts unfamiliar with 
tax-oriented terminology; this is certainly true as the cases show,242 
but construction problems plagued the courts long before the advent 
of formula clauses. The continuing exposure of judges to such dis-
positions, accompanied by enlightened guidance from attorneys and 
use of court-proven orthodox language243 may go far toward mitigat-
ing whatever peril is posed. 
The further argument that changes in the tax law may necessitate 
return under I.R.C., § 642(g), this did not increase the amount which was to pass to 
the widow under the provision of the will. The maximum marital deduction was 
therefore limited to the adjusted gross estate less such administration expenses. The 
court indicates in dicta, however, that, if the will had provided only that the wife 
receive "an amount equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate as computed for 
federal estate tax purposes," the larger amount equal to one-half of the adjusted 
gross estate would have been deductible. 
236. See text accompanying notes 133-46 supra, for a description of fractional-share 
problems. A leading case discussing the problem is Tilghman v. Frazer, 119 Md. 620, 87 
A.2d 811 (1952), discussed in 37 MINN. L. REv. 303 (1953). See also Proctor v. American 
Security & Trust Co., 98 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
237. See, e.g., Boehm, Comparing the Relative Tax Costs of Alternative Treatment 
of &tale and Income Deductions and Valuation Adjustments, 31 RoCltY MT. L. REv. 
172 (1959); Polasky, supra note 216, at 6, and authorities collected therein. 
238. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 217, at 943; Craven, supra note 221, at 619. 
239. I.R.C., § 2032. 
240. Craven, supra note 221, at 619. 
241. Craven, supra note 221, at 618; Juhl, Executor Should Have Power To Choose 
Assets for Marital Deduction Bequest, 15 J. TAXATION 335 (1961); Report of Subcom-
mittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra note 217, at 943; Straus, 
Revenue Procedure 64-91-When Should Agreements Be Made?, 103 TRUSTS & EsrATES 
911 (1964). 
242. See Durand, Planning Lessons From Marital Deduction Litigation, 101 TRUSTS 
& EsrATES 8 (1962). 
243. Ibid. 
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revision of the provision244 hardly mflitates against use of a formula 
clause by the lawyer aware of the need for constant review of dis-
positive plans in the light of changing circumstances, nor does the 
possibility of a warping of the plan by the widow's possible election 
to take against the will245 or the once-raised but apparently dis-
sipated spectre that such clauses might violate the rule against 
perpetuities. 246 
To most counselors, the arguments against formula clauses are 
impressive but not persuasive when balanced against the tendency 
of the formula clause to allow adjustments to changing circum-
stances247 (particularly those involving uncertainty as to asset val-
ues)248 in order to obtain the maximum marital deduction and the 
additional factor of avoidance of frequent redrafting of dispositive 
instruments. 249 
For many, therefore, the question is not "whether" to use such 
a clause but "which" type of formula to employ.250 
B. Choice as Between Formula Clauses 
I. "True" Pecuniary and Fractional Share Clauses 
Marshalling the pros and cons in choosing between types of 
formula clauses is somewhat more difficult because of the prolifera-
tion of varieties of pecuniary and fractional share patterns and the 
emergence of clauses which can only be described as hybrids. 
If discussion can be limited to the "true fractional share" clause 
(requiring a distribution of a fractional interest in each asset of 
the residuary estate, as described) and the "true pecuniary" clause 
(distribution date values being used to measure the quantum neces-
sary to satisfy the gift), some observations are possible. 
a. Advantages of Pecuniary Clauses 
Most commentators would probably agree that the pecuniary 
formula is easier to express than the fractional share;2111 certainly 
244. Craven, supra note 221, at 618. 
245. Ibid. 
246. Id. at 620; Polasky, supra note 216, at 43, and citations therein. 
247. Craven, supra note 221, at 621; Durand, Draftsmanship-Wills and Trusts, 96 
TRusrs &: EsTATES 871, 874 (1957); Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and 
the Marital Deduction, supra note 217, at 943. 
248. Craven, supra note 221, at 616. See Stevens, How To Draft Marital Deduction 
Formula Clauses, 20 J. TAXATION 352 (1964). 
249. Craven, supra note 221, at 617. 
250. See Report of Subcommittee on Forms for Marital Deduction Planning, supra 
note 217. . 
251. Bolte, supra note 210, at 538. 
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it is easier to explain to the client.252 Others, however, have suggested 
that the fractional share provision is perfectly susceptible of lucid 
draftsmanship, though they differ as to whether it should be ex-
plained in somewhat less complex language253 than that used in the 
numerator-denominator approach.254 
The pecuniary formula also offers somewhat greater opportuni-
ties for post-mortem planning than does the true fractional share,255 
though some of the imagined joys of the tax-value formula have been 
curtailed by Rev. Proc. 64-19. As an officer of a major corporate 
fiduciary puts it, "This type of formula clause permits a certain 
amount of post-mortem estate planning if the fiduciary is given 
authority to select and allocate assets. With such a grant of authority, 
municipal bonds may be allocated to the marital gift and stocks 
allocated to the residuary trust designed to bypass the wife's estate 
for estate tax purposes, or perhaps a balanced portfolio allocated to 
the marital gift and stock in a family business to the residuary trust. 
A clause of this type may be set up in a way which permits a good 
deal of flexibility in the allocation of assets."256 
Further, as suggested by the analysis of income tax consequences, 
the pecuniary formula allowing selection of assets permits a choice 
of timing and tax impact in recognition of gains and allocation of tax 
basis at distribution.257 In addition, it does freeze the widow's share, 
in terms of dollar value,258 upon determination of the "amount"; 
this is accompanied by a shifting of appreciation (and depreciation):!59 
during administration to the nonmarital share.260 
252. And, presumably, it is easier to explain to revenue agents. See the detailed 
brief in favor of the numerator-denominator type of fractional share clause and the 
reasons why it should become understandable for Service personnel in Durbin, 
Marital Deduction Formula Revisited, 102 TRUSTS&: ESTATES 545, 546 (1963). 
253. Golden, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 103 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 536 (1964). See also Craven, 
supra note 221, at 623-25. 
254. Discussion of the numerator-denominator approach is found in Bolte, supra 
note 210, at 543-44; Casner, How To Use Fractional Share Marital Deduction Gifts, 
99 TRUST'S &: ESTATES 190 (1960); Durbin, supra note 252. 
255. Id. at 546. 
256. Stevens, supra note 248. 
257. This statement assumes, of course, that effective use of problem-pecuniary 
language with the addition of a clause meeting the minimum-value test is permissible 
under state fiduciary law. Cf. In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 
(1956), construing N.Y. DECED. EST. LAw § 125-2. See also Report of Subcommittee on 
Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra note 217, at 944 n.66, which collects 
the New York cases. 
258. The time for fixing the amount depends upon determination of federal 
estate tax values and upon the executor's election of whether to use the alternative 
valuation date permitted by I.R.C., § 2032. 
259. See Craven, supra note 221, at 621. 
260. Stevens, supra note 248, at 352. 
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b. Advantages of Fractional Share Clauses 
These latter features, which explain the appeal of the pecuniary 
to some counselors, are regarded by fractional-share enthusiasts as 
reasons for avoiding a pecuniary clause.261 The flexibility, as they see 
it, leads to administrative problems stemming from "the funda-
mental duty and responsibility of a fiduciary to be impartial and 
the inadvisability of employing any technique which might possibly 
sow the seeds of family discord by giving to the wife and children a 
different type or quality of interest in the estate."262 A true frac-
tional share, deemed to require distribution of a fractional interest 
in each available asset, tends to forestall opportunity for preferential 
treatment stemming from asset selection and clearly avoids recogni-
tion of gain or loss on distribution (while passing the estate's basis 
to the distributee). 
To some, it appears safer263 and would be preferable on this 
ground alone, although this assumption seems questionable. The 
fractional share does, nevertheless, present greater administrative 
problems for the fiduciary. Even when properly drawn, extreme care 
in trust accounting is required264 in applying the fraction to income 
and principal distributions, and the problem is compounded by 
the fact that the fraction cannot be definitely ascertained until fed-
eral estate tax values and the content of the gross estate have been 
finally determined. Meanwhile, non-pro-rata partial distributions 
alter both the pool and the fraction of the pool to which the marital 
share is entitled. 
On final distribution, distribution of a fractional share of each 
asset does have the advantage of not requiring a second valuation of 
assets (a not inconsiderable burden where closely-held stock or other 
small business interests are involved); yet the distribution of frac-
tional interests presents both a cumbersome procedure and seemingly 
undesirable fractional property interests. Even applying a rela-
tively simple fraction like 4100/7243 to IOO shares of stock indicates 
the problem, though it is common practice to sell the portion not 
apportionable in whole shares (with such expense as that involves). 
Distribution of a similar fractional interest in Greenacres is certainly 
possible (if not desirable), but it leaves a rather awkward fractional 
interest in the several devisees, particularly if later disagreement 
261. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 253, at 537. 
262. Id. at 536. 
263. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 217, at 945. 
264. See, e.g., McGorry, Pecuniary or Fractional Formula!, 98 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 422, 
425 (1959). 
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leads to a partition action. Disagreement has been expressed205 with 
the conclusion that a fractional share of each asset should be dis-
tributed absent specification to the contrary.206 Some have sug-
gested that the clause could permit selection of assets equivalent to 
the distribution date value of the fractional share.267 Yet such selec-
tion of specific assets, equal in value, requires a second valuation as 
of distribution date; and in this context it is possible that the Service 
may raise the very questions posed in earlier articles.268 
2. "Hybrid" Clauses 
Departure from the true fractional share in favor of a ratable-
sharing fraction (satisfiable with selected assets) tends to ameliorate 
some of the true fractional share's disadvantages, but at the same 
time some of the orthodox fractional share's posited advantages are 
lost (thus incurring disadvantages similar to those posed by the 
pecuniary). Similarly, departure from the orthodox or true pecuniary 
in favor of one of the several tax-value pecuniary clauses tends 
to pick up, in some measure, advantages associated with the frac-
tional share while modifying or departing from advantageous fea-
tures of the orthodox pecuniary clause. Neither of the exchanges, 
however, is even! The degree to which relative advantages and dis-
advantages are substituted varies with the type of clause used. 
a. Minimum-Value Pecuniaries 
The tax-value pecuniary employing a minimum-value clause 
represents a comparatively minor departure from the orthodox 
pecuniary. In many cases, it will yield quite similar results (except 
for possible differences in allocation of bases of assets received by 
the distributee). In other, less typical situations, such as a distribu-
tion comprised entirely of appreciated assets, the tax-value 
clause results in "over-funding" and no capital gain vis-a-vis mini-
mum funding but recognition of capital gain under a true pecu-
niary. But, in either case, the widow is assured of at least a minimum 
actual value equal to the allowed marital deduction. 
265. Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, supra 
note 217, at 945. 
266. 1 CAsNER, EsrATE PLANNING 798 (3d ed. 1961). 
267. Golden, supra note 253, at 538. The view of one official of the Internal Revenue 
Service is expressed in Reiling, Revenue Procedure 64-19-Rethinking Marital De-
duction Clauses, 103 TRusrs & EsrATES 905, 906 (1964). 
268. See Casner, supra note 254; see also Casner, A Fiduciary's Powers and the 
Marital Deduction, 100 TRusrs & EsTATES 247, 248 (1961) (particularly "Case 4'). 
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b. Ratable-Sharing Pecuniaries 
The ratable-sharing pecuniary, that hybrid using tax values and 
requiring a sharing of appreciation or depreciation, results in a 
significantly greater deviation from· the true pecuniary. One com-
mentator260 has summarized its advantages as follows: (I) like the 
true pecuniary (and fractional-share) "it makes certain that the maxi-
mum marital deduction will be available," (2) it eliminates the 
"constructive sale" possibility and avoids recognition of gains on 
distribution, (3) the requirement of equitable sharing of apprecia-
tion or depreciation during administration avoids the administrative 
problems posed by a formula (like the true pecuniary) permitting 
the fiduciary to prefer one beneficiary over another, and (4) the 
"tax value formula clause requirement of sharing of appreciation 
or depreciation does not apply to each individual asset but only to 
the estate as a whole,"270 as distinguished from the true fractional 
share. 
In short, it has the same advantages and disadvantages as a frac-
tional share formula, which permits distribution of selected assets 
equivalent to the distribution date value of the fractional interest 
in the residue. But, in addition, it presents the additional adminis-
trative problem, previously noted, of apparently requiring that at 
distribution date the assets distributed must have both a federal 
estate tax value equal to the marital deduction to be obtained and 
distribution date values representing a ratable sharing of apprecia-
tion and depreciation of the pool from which they are drawn. To the 
jaundiced eye, the acquired disadvantages seem to somewhat out-
weigh any additional advantages as compared to the true pecuniary, 
the tax-value minimum-value pecuniary, the true fractional share, 
and, last and least, the "pecuniary fractional share" (permitting dis-
tribution of selected assets equal in value to the fractional share of 
the pool to which the marital share is entitled). 
3. The Ultimate Choice 
One could not have predicted with certainty the development 
of the recent controversy over problem-pecuniary Ianguage,271 though 
some perceptively suggested the possibility.272 Perhaps some latter-
day seer, peering under small blades of grass, will venture to suggest 
269. Stevens, supra note 248. 
270. Id. at 354, 355. 
271. Golden, supra note 253. 
272. 1 CAsNER, op. cit. supra note 266, at 816; Casner, supra note 268, at 248 
(Case 3). 
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publicly that a fractional share clause granting the fiduciary the 
broad powers described by one commentator may also give rise to 
a similar problem.273 
Rev. Proc. 64-19 has now clarified the Service's position on the 
effect of problem-pecuniary language and the circumstances under 
which the gift will qualify for the marital deduction. Where analysis 
suggests that it will probably be desirable both to avoid recognition 
of gain or loss at distribution and to minimize augmentation of the 
widow's potential estate by channeling appreciation to the residuary 
trust, the tax-value pecuniary with a minimum-value provision may 
be useful. In the larger number of estates, where possible recognition 
of gains is not deemed serious from an overall tax analysis or where 
the probable composition of estate assets suggests that careful selec-
tion of assets for distribution can largely avoid gain on satisfaction 
of a fixed amount due, the true pecuniary formula may appear best. 
Both the minimum-value and the true pecuniary assure the 
widow of a minimum amount equal to the available marital deduc-
tion, though a decline in values during administration may signifi-
cantly reduce the share of assets allocable to the residuary legatees. 
If this latter point is of major concern to the testator, it might be 
well to provide pecuniary legacies in the minimum desired dollar 
amount for both the widow and other beneficiaries, these to be satis• 
fied before application of the formula to the residue. 
If, on the other hand, family relationships and circumstances 
suggest the desirability of ratable-sharing of appreciation and depre-
ciation during administration, it may be suggested that the true, 
orthodox fractional-share formula should be employed in preference 
273. See Casner, supra note 254; see also Casner, supra note 268, at 248 (particularly 
"Case 4''). 
Our latter-day seer might suggest, for example, that the executor could, during 
administration, vary the quantum flowing to the marital share by his choice of assetll 
to satisfy pecuniary bequests, expenses, debts, taxes, and the like when the residue is 
constituted only after these obligations have been satisfied. The Service has, after all, 
expressed some rather disturbing thoughts about the requirement of "vesting" and 
about a qualifying interest being determinable at death: "A bequest to a surviving 
spouse may qualify for the marital deduction only to the extent that it vests at the 
time of the testator's death. Thus, since the executor may elect to value the estate one 
year after death, the significant question is whether a pecuniary bequest in the amount 
of the 'maximum marital deduction' can vest prior to the alternate valuation date and 
the time when the executor is bound -to make the election or decide not to do so." 
Reiling, supra note 267. A well-phrased rebuttal is set forth in Straus, supra note 241. 
See also Revenue Procedure 64-19-Panel Discussion, 103 TRusrs &: EsrATES 917 (1964). 
Of course, such arguments should not be persuasive to a court which bears in 
mind the purpose of the legislation. (Report of Subcommittee on Estate Planning and 
the Marital Deduction, 102 TRUsrs &: EsrATES 934 (1963); WARREN &: SURREY, FEDERAL 
EsrATE AND GIFT TAXATION 749 (1961).) But suffice it to say that a prudent estate 
planner is not inclined to risk controversy where a less hazardous path is available for 
reaching ,the same goal! 
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to any of the described hybrid clauses; and the inherent administra-
tive obligations of careful fiduciary accounting and distribution of 
the available residue according to the determined fraction should 
be manfully shouldered. 
Obviously, problem-pecuniary language should be avoided unless 
measures are taken to comply with the requirements of Rev. Proc. 
64-19. Further, though thoughtful and able commentators may 
rationally differ, this preliminary analysis suggests that the ratable-
sharing tax-value pecuniary formula, regardless of local fiduciary 
law, may be an unhappy choice absent peculiar circumstances not 
here considered. Indeed, should state law be deemed to require 
ratable-sharing when a tax-value pecuniary provision is employed, 
use of the true pecuniary would be preferable to the minimum-value 
provision. 274 
C. A Word About "Clarifying'' Legislation 
This suggests a thought about proposals for state legislation to 
complement Rev. Proc. 64-19. The wisdom of enacting state statutes 
prescribing rules of fiduciary administration for the sole purpose 
of seeking compliance with federal tax fiat as expressed in adminis-
trative releases may be open to serious question.275 But, if such 
legislation should somehow be deemed necessary to make clear that 
state law requires distributions within the permitted limitations of 
Rev. Proc. 64-19, the legislation should direct use of the minimum-
value route.276 If the analysis herein is valid, such legislation should 
not require that assets distributed under a tax-value clause must be 
fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation.277 Nor, ap-
parently, should it be drafted along the lines of the recently enacted 
Mississippi statute, which provides that such a tax-value clause re-
274. As to the grant of discretion in the dispositive instrument, see note 69 supra. 
275. The testator's choice of dispositive directions should not be fettered because 
of fear of loss of tax "advantages" by the unwary; at the least, the legislation should 
be phrased in terms of "unless otherwise provided •.• " in order to permit leeway for 
desired dispositions. 
276. Would such legislation change the effect of problem-pecuniary language 
from the result decreed in In re Bush's Will and its interpretation of N.Y. D.ECED. 
Esr. I.Aw § 125-2? Such legislation would not seem necessary in New York. Moreover, 
since it prescribes only that property distributed in satisfaction of the bequest shall 
amount to "no less than" the deduction allowed, would not the executor be required 
to allocate appredation ratably under the New York rule? The legislation could make 
it clear that only the minimum amount is required (in order to permit the advantages 
outlined for the "minimum-value" route) and that the testator may grant a power 
to the fiduciary to allocate appreciation entirely within his discretion. 
277. A letter, dated December 7, 1964, from Mr. G. Van Velsor Wolf of Baltimore, 
Maryland, indicates that a statute of this type was recently presented for the 
consideration of the Probate and Estate Law Committee of the Maryland State Bar 
Association. 
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quires the fiduciary to "satisfy the bequest by either distributing(!) 
assets having an aggregate fair market value on the dates of distribu-
tion not less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer in 
trust as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, or (2) 
assets fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in the 
value of all property available for distribution .... "278 It has been 
reported that "the Chief Counsel [of the Internal Revenue Service] 
has recently pointed out that the new Mississippi statute does not 
make the grade."279 This, presumably, is because the legislation 
affords the fiduciary the choice of satisfying the bequest by either a 
minimum-value or ratable-sharing approach. Apparently, to "qual-
ify" under Rev. Proc. 64-19, state law must clearly direct distribution 
in accordance with one, and only one, of the alternative routes 
(minimum-value or ratable-sharing);280 the fiduciary is not to be 
allowed a choice in the light of hindsight. Undoubtedly other varia-
tions will appear in proposed legislation.281 
VI. OBSERVATIONS IN RETROSPECT 
The mind of man is indeed a fertile breeding ground for in-
geniously devised schemes, which in turn require the utmost skill 
to implement. All too often this is at the risk of an inordinate 
expenditure of time and effort, to say nothing of the anxiety of the 
draftsman and fiduciary and the confusion of the testator and 
beneficiaries. Perhaps this is simply a hallmark of an extremely tax.-
conscious and economically-oriented society; perhaps it is character-
istic of the professional inheritance of the modern lawyer derived 
from a long tradition of a hallowed craft dedicated to precise (if 
complex and cumbersome) draftsmanship in order to avoid the stric-
tures and effects of extant legislation. 
Surely there will be some who will continue to question the 
wisdom of employing complex dispositive provisions. But attempts 
at modification such as substitution of a non-formula fractional share 
278. 4 P-H FEDERAL TAXES f 32361 (1964), as reported therein. 
279. Speech by Mr. John Sheets, Estate and Gift Tax Branch, National Office, 
Internal Revenue Service, before the Chicago Bar Association, Dec. I, 1964, in CCH 
FED. EsT. &: GIFr TAX REP. 1f 8147, at 2739 (1964). 
280. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02. 
281. It is reported that proposed Florida legislation would require the fiduciary to 
apply a form of "minimum-value" approach to a pecuniary bequest and a ratable• 
sharing approach to a clause which the court construes as a fractional share. This 
would seem to put a premium on the necessity of a court construction in order to 
determine the executor's duty; however, more complete analysis should await ap-
pearance of an actual draft. See discussion in Covey, Statutory Panacea for 61-191 104 
TRUSTS &: EsrATES 69 (1965). 
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(for example, a bequest to the marital trust of "one-half of the 
residue of my estate") will not obviate entirely the necessity for 
careful legal drafting if the gift is to qualify for the marital deduc-
tion and be capable of administration; indeed, such clauses give rise 
to problems of their own. 
Others in quest of greater simplicity may tum to specific alloca-
tion of assets with an attempt at qualifying assets directed toward the 
wife or marital trust, letting the chips fall where they may if signifi-
cant changes in the nature or valuation of the clients' assets produce 
either under-qualification or over-funding. Rumor has it that some 
may even tum to a non-formula pecuniary gift such as a bequest to 
the wife of "forty-five per cent of my adjusted gross estate .... " 
It seems likely, however, that, despite the anxiety caused by 
periodic flurries of excitement over the tax consequences and prob-
lems of judicial interpretation of formula clauses, their use by a 
major segment of the profession will continue. Hopefully, exposure 
of potential problems will lead to the evolution of dispositive provi-
sions that will produce the desired qualification for the marital 
deduction and be susceptible of effective administration. Perhaps, on 
the other hand, the draftsman will eschew the clever clause designed 
to achieve the best of all worlds--achievement of the maximum 
marital deduction coupled with the possibility of disinheriting the 
Director of Internal Revenue through sage application of hindsight 
--or the development of hybrid clauses designed to incorporate the 
best features of both a pecuniary bequest and a fractional share (and 
perhaps reaping the potential disadvantages of each). One might 
even express the pious hope that when that day arrives, the Internal 
Revenue Service, mindful of the technical difficulties inherent in 
qualification for the marital deduction, will approach the question 
of disallowance with an attitude conducive to effectuating the spirit 
of the legislation and with somewhat less concern for inadvertent 
errors which under strict technical application of the statute could 
draconically deny the entire deduction. 
If the arrival of the millenium is not likely in the realistically 
foreseeable future, perhaps we shall see a reasonable accommodation 
of the views of both those who would counsel against the formula 
clause and those who regard them as useful, if not essential. 
Even today, the wise attorney does not automatically and un-
thinkingly apply a stock formula clause in all dispositive instru-
ments. As he always has, he continues to analyze carefully the poten-
tial assets of both the gross estate for tax purposes and the probate 
estate which must be administered. His goal now, as before the 
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advent of the marital deduction, is to counsel with the client in order 
to work out a wise disposition of assets in the best interests of 
survivors and then to draft appropriate dispositive instruments 
which will achieve those aims with a minimal tax impact and a 
minimization of foreseeable administration problems. Perhaps he 
will follow the wise suggestion of one of the profession's ablest 
spokesmen282 and put major emphasis on careful arrangement of 
assets, both those passing under the will and those falling outside the 
probate estate. Careful attention will be given to qualifying for the 
marital deduction what is deemed to be a desirable quantum of 
assets; and specific assets will be bequeathed to designated benefi-
ciaries and trusts in accordance with the sensible aims of the testator. 
For example, where the estate consists partly of stock in a closely 
held corporation and this is to be retained for certain benefici-
aries, 283 it may be appropriate to bequeath the stock specifically, or at 
least a portion of it, to those beneficiaries and to carve out other as-
sets (such as the residence, investment securities, and the like) to be 
qualified for the marital gift. Similarly, other assets which would 
not qualify for the marital deduction may be allocated to the non-
marital trust when this seems desirable. 
But the dispositive plan will not end here. Just as the attorney 
recognizes (and advises his client) that a planned disposition of 
assets tailored to meet current problems may later need revision 
to meet changing circumstances, so too he will realize that the esti-
mated gross estate for federal tax purposes may be augmented by 
receipt of additional assets and, all too commonly, by undisclosed 
or inappropriately described assets which were not properly taken 
into consideration in "carving out" the allocation of assets in the 
will. Having allocated assets on the basis of existing known circum-
stances, the prudent attorney may employ a formula clause as a 
"back-up," funding an additional qualifying bequest or share from 
assets unallocated by the dispositive instrument. True, there may 
be little or nothing upon which it can operate. But, if the decedent 
should later acquire substantial additional assets for ·which ap• 
propriate provision had not been made, the formula clause could 
direct allocation of a desirable share for the surviving spouse's 
benefit in a manner which would produce a desired additional 
qualification of assets for the available marital deduction. 
282. Trachtman, Marital Deduction-Use of Non-Formula Provisions, N.Y.U. 19TH 
!Nsr. ON FED. TAX 631 (1961). 
283. See generally Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest 
in a Closely Held Business-The Corporation: Stock-Purchase Agreements and 
Redemption of Shares, 46 IOWA L. REv. 516 (1961). 
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Admittedly, this method is directed primarily to the problem 
of unforeseen underqualification. It does not solve or even mitigate 
overqualification resulting from passing to the widow a quantum of 
qualifying assets which is greater than that necessary to achieve the 
maximum marital deduction. No mere formula clause by its own 
sole operation can completely cover that problem if qualifying non-
probate gifts, such as insurance and joint tenancy property, exceed 
the maximum available marital deduction, although in such cases 
the formula will "mitigate the tax impact" of overqualification by 
directing assets subject to its operation to the nonmarital share. 
Concern over overqualification led to the use of the formula 
clause as the basic dispositive device and still suggests to some wTiters 
its desirability as contrasted to the carving-out pattern, which may 
minimize the mitigating effect of the formula by reducing the assets 
upon which it operates. Nevertheless, just as the problem of avoiding 
capital gains may be overemphasized, so too may the danger of over-
qualification. If death of the surviving spouse occurs within a ten-
year period, a credit for previously taxed (overqualified) property 
will be available. While the credit decreases with the passage of time, 
that time interval itself will usually provide a reasonable opportunity 
for further planning to minimize potential taxes and probate ex-
penses upon the death of the surviving spouse. 
Finally, and perhaps by way of postscript, we may ultimately see 
the day when the allegory with which the article began is concluded. 
Some have become at least mildly disenchanted with the attempt 
through use of the marital deduction to achieve actual equality of 
tax burdens as between community property and common-law 
states; a rough parity is, at best, achieved.284 The philosopher-lawyer 
who labors in the vineyard of "estate planning" may experi-
ence at least some mild dissatisfaction when, in a thoughtful mo-
ment, he contemplates today's somewhat frenzied efforts to tailor 
dispositions to surviving spouses in a manner largely influenced by 
tax considerations. Surely it may occur to him, as it has to 
others,285 that, if interspousal transfers were freed of succession 
284. On the marital deduction and community property, see generally Anderson, 
The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 
Between Common Law and Community Property States, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1087 (1956); 
DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. 
L. REV. 79 (1950); Hammonds & Ray, Understanding the Community-Property Idea 
Clarifies Taxation of Individuals, 6 J. TAXATION 2 (1957). 
285. DeWind, supra note 284, at 109; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-
The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1161 (1948). See GRISWOLD, FEDERAL 
TAXATION 943 (5th ed. 1960). 
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tax burdens, somewhat more rational dispositions might often be 
made;286 and it can be seen that such exemption of interspousal 
transfers should not result in drastic reduction of federal estate tax 
revenues if it be recalled that the exemption will not permit assets 
to escape taxation but will merely result in a postponement of tax. 
Bearing in mind that the federal estate tax has a progressive rate 
structure, there might still be attempts to minimize overall taxes by 
passing only a portion of the estate to the surviving spouse, leaving 
a portion to be taxed in the husband's estate. Yet, as applied to large 
estates, the tax rate brackets are quite broad, and the rate of progres-
sion is reasonably modest. The effective rate on a taxable estate 
of 2,000,000 dollars is about 37.5 per cent (tax being 753,200 dol-
lars), while on taxable estates of 1,000,000 dollars the effective rate 
is about 32.5 per cent (the estate tax figure being 325,700 dollars). 
Since the difference in effective rates is somewhat less than confis-
catory, any unhealthy predisposition toward the tax tail wagging the 
dispositive dog might tend to evanesce. 
Should such a change in the law come to pass,287 the marital 
deduction, that delightful newcomer born to an eager and joyous 
profession, that golden-haired child which proved a source of comfort 
and of only occasional irritation during its early years, which 
entered upon the terrible teens and became a source of exaspera-
tion, bewilderment, and frenzied attempts to cope with it, which 
finally reached maturity and with adult treatment responded to the 
needs of the society it served and was regulated by reasonable sanc-
tions (subject only to occasional aberrational conduct by both the 
governed and governor), will ultimately, as do all men, pass from 
the scene having served its purpose; it will leave only memories (and 
a few scars), gradually fading with time, of the excitement and 
frustration which occurred during its limited life. 
286. This issue is likely to be considered in connection with the ALI's Federal 
Estate and Gift Tax Project. Although the author is a consultant for the Project, the 
view suggested here is a purely personal one, and no conclusion should be drawn of 
either agreement or disagreement by others connected with the Project. 
287. Less far-reaching legislation affecting marital bequests may be advanced in 
the interim. Such proposals may include statutory modification of the effect of Jackson 
v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964). See the suggestions in 63 MICH. L. REv. 924 (1965). 
In addition, modification of the Treasury's position that formula legacies do not 
come within the specific bequest exemption of I.R.C., § 663(a)(l) may be advanced 
anew. See I CAsNER, op. cit. supra note 266, at 88-91, discussing earlier legislation which 
failed of enactment. 
